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Neo: There are only two possible explanations: either no one
told me, or no one knows.
The Architect: Precisely. As you are undoubtedly gathering,
the anomaly’s systemic, creating ﬂuctuations in even the most
simplistic equations. . . an anomaly that if left unchecked might
threaten the system itself.
Source: The Matrix Reloaded
1 Introduction
While the subject of systemic risk is enjoying a well-deserved surge of interest,
many of the systemic risk researchers and practitioners would privately admit
of yearning for a more fundamental deﬁnition and analysis of systemic risk1
to complement the operational and somehow ad-hoc deﬁnitions currently in
use. For concreteness, let us mention the widely used and useful joint IMF,
BIS and FSB (2009) deﬁnition proposed that deﬁnes a systemic event as
the disruption to the ﬂow of ﬁnancial services that is (i) caused
by an impairment of all or parts of the ﬁnancial system; and (ii)
has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the
real economy.
While in broad agreement with this deﬁnition, our aim is to micro found the
concept and to approach the question from the more fundamental concept of
an “economic system.” Indeed, we do not believe it satisfactory to analyse
systemic risk before ﬁrst having reﬂected on what a system is in the ﬁrst
place. If the term “system” has no meaning over and above “aggregate,”
“systematic” or even “non-chaotic aggregate,” then it is not clear what sys-
temic risk means over and above aggregate or systematic risk.
Within the rapidly expanding literature on systemic risk – mostly post 2007/8
– several authors stand out, for example the useful survey paper by Bisias
1It may be worthwhile pointing out that one of the most insightful and prescient books
attempting to understand the foundations of the notion of systemic risk is Kambhu et al.
(2007), written on the back of a conference in 2006 prior to the crisis starting in 2007.
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et al. (2012) and the recent insightful books by Gai (2013) or Fouque and
Langsam (2013). These authors use the term in a variety of ways, shedding
promising light on diﬀerent relevant aspects of systemic risk without a need
for a deﬁnitive deﬁnition. That is common and commonsensical practice
in science, of course. From these works it can be gleaned that the authors
clearly do view systemic risk as a concept distinct from “aggregate risk”
or “systematic risk,” even if a commonly accepted deﬁnition of systemic
risk is lacking. Our aim is to base the idea of systemic risk on a more
solid epistemological basis, thereby allowing for a clear distinction between
systemic risk and other forms of risk.
Risk also often refers to the risk of the external exogenous shocks that play
the role of inputs, as opposed to the risk that the outcomes of these shocks
create once they work through the system. For instance, “idiosyncratic risk”
stands for idiosyncratic shocks that hit individual exogenous factors such as
endowments and preferences but wash out in the aggregate, while “aggregate
risk” stands for the shocks that do not wash out, such as common shocks.
In fact, aggregate risk is often simply the arithmetic sum of all idiosyncratic
risks, and we shall argue later on that this concept would not in the philos-
ophy of science count as a systemic, or emergent, property.
In our view, systemic risk is a fruitful concept if we interpret it in a systems
context. It not only captures the exogenous risk that hits the system and may
prevent the system from functioning properly, but it is also the endogenous
risk that is generated by the system itself, even if the proper functioning
of the system itself is not at risk. So according to the direct and indirect
meanings given to these terms in everyday language,
systemic risk comprises the risk to the proper functioning of the
system as well as the risk created by the system.
Of course, these two risks can overlap, and a shock within the system and then
ampliﬁed by the system can lead to the auto destruction of large components
of the system up to the entire the system itself, or indeed up to the real
economy that embeds the system from which the shock emanates.
This concept of endogenous risk and its inherent positive feedback loops is
closely related to systemic risk, see Danielsson and Shin (2003) and Daniels-
son and Zigrand (2008). The idea of ampliﬁcation through interaction has
a bit of the ﬂavour described by Miller and Page (2007), “in systems char-
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acterised by the central limit theorem, interactions cancel one another out
and result in a smooth bell curve. In complex systems, interactions reinforce
one another and result in behaviour that is very diﬀerent from the norm.”
Similarly, a system is deﬁned by its connective structure between elements.
A network whose structure of interactions does not allow for diversiﬁcation
or averaging of individual eﬀects can by itself be a signiﬁcant propagator of
shocks (see e.g. Jovanovic (1987) in a game-theoretic setting, Durlauf (1993)
in a local-interaction setting and Acemoglu et al. (2012) in a network set-
ting). In that sense, the interesting emergent properties in social systems,
such as stock market crashes, banking crises, runs on the repo, riots etc., are
primarily those that occur if large-number-type forces do not apply because
of feedback loops.
In the rest of the paper we provide an intuitive account of the economic
thought on systems and the development of the notion of systemic risk. The
journey is illustrated by putting the ideas of system systemic risk and en-
dogenous risk in a historical perspective.
2 What is a System?
The ﬁrst task is to set out what we mean by a system. We believe that there
is value in formalising the notion of a system somewhat and that the scientiﬁc
content of the term “system” ought to be founded on the everyday use of
this term. The following discussion is inspired by the textbook exposition
in Mandy (1988) and a fuller epistemological discussion can be found in
Appendix A.
In everyday language, certain realities qualify as forming a system while
others do not. For instance:
cluster of stars and planets vs solar system
collection of milestones vs metric system
lump of nerve cells vs nervous system
miscellanea vs information system
population of individuals as such vs social system
buses and trains vs public transportation system
lines of computer code vs operating system
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In the science of economics and ﬁnance,
population of prices vs price system
collection of banks vs banking system (Federal Reserve
System, Eurosystem)
set of local monetary arrangements vs international monetary system
bilateral payment and
settlement arrangements vs payment system
tax and spending rules vs ﬁscal system
With these examples in mind, the casual speaker would perhaps mention
three characteristics of what constitutes a system – as opposed to merely a
collection:
1. these expressions make reference to something, to a central concept;
2. their elements imply relationships;
3. in systems that evolve, which is the case especially of social and eco-
nomic systems, they keep their identity.
In the scientiﬁc context of ﬁnancial economics, the corresponding character-
istics for economic systems are:
1. deductibility from the axiom of economicity, or the economising axiom,
implying reference to a common principle and formal elements that are
functions and serve an economic purpose, i.e. economic calculus2;
2. irreducibility, and therefore emergent properties due to interrelations;
3. continuity of identity.
To summarise, deductibility from the axiom of economicity bestows upon
the elements the consistent and coherent shine and approach encapsulated in
the eﬀort to realise economic surplus. All elements being logically deduced
2In the words of Allais (1981) “In their essence all economic operations, whatever they
may be, can be thought of as boiling down to the pursuit, realisation and allocation of
distributable surpluses.”
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from this same axiom, they do not allow dislocations between the various
elements. Irreducibility allows the system to distinguish itself from its parts
by its organisation.
For social and economic systems, deductibility from the axiom of economicity
further implies that the system is distinct from its parts due to the function
the system plays. In the physical sciences this need not necessarily be the
case. For instance, the beautiful organisation of the atoms of a crystal is an
end product in itself, one not performing any function. A social system on
the other hand must be functioning, or as Vining (1984) says, it must be a
working thing, a machine functioning towards accomplishing an aim, an aim
embedded in the principle of deductibility from the axiom of economicity.3
It may not be perfect, but it possesses some minimal requirements, not least
consistency, coherence and an ongoing goal.
Systems that possess strong or novel emergent properties are often called
complex systems. In analysing the price formation system for instance, Mills
(1927) argued that the behaviour of the whole is not to be explained in
terms of the behaviour of the individual elements that make it up, that the
attributes of the whole are not to be arrived at by summing the attributes of
the separate parts. Later on, Simon (1996, p. 184) writes that “in [complex
systems] the whole is more than the sum of the parts in the weak but im-
portant pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws
of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the
whole.” As examples, a living cell is more than the sum of inert molecules
that it is composed of, and human conscience is more than a sum of neu-
rons. Below we see corresponding examples from the ﬁnancial world – a price
system, a payment system and a banking system – in detail.
3The discussion of what a “system” is is not unlike the long-standing discussion as
to what a “machine” is. Adam Smith (1795) on page 60 already wrote that “Systems in
many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to perform, as well
as to connect together, in reality, those diﬀerent movements and eﬀects which the artist
has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect together in the
fancy those diﬀerent movements and eﬀects which are already in reality performed.” More
recently, Ashby (1945, 1947, 1956) and Farmer (2007) have argued that a taxonomy of
machines would be based on function, not on form, ancestry or material composition. For
instance, Ashby’s deﬁnition of a machine is “that which behaves in the same way as does a
closed single-valued transformation,” capturing the mechanical or “machine-like” working
that is mapping its internal state and the state of its surroundings into a new state, and
then adds that “it should be noticed that the deﬁnition refers to a way of behaving, not
to a material thing.”
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3 Economic and Financial Systems
In the context of systemic risk, the advantage of viewing a system as a
working mechanism, and not as an outcome of the thing that is doing the
working, is twofold. First, only a working mechanism can break down in the
ﬁrst place. Second, it allows researchers to focus on the mechanism that cre-
ates destructive systemic events, as opposed to the outcomes or the original
input shocks that can lead to the displacement of the original equilibrium
and to the unfolding of the destructive mechanism. Since it is unlikely that
researchers can adequately forecast the next triggering shock, it would be
valuable to understand how susceptible the system is to shocks – its systemic
fragility – and how to redesign the system in a way to prevent the build-up of
destructive positive feedbacks or cascades, and to introduce circuit breakers
and other devices that can cut the feedbacks.
Walras and Pareto were both preoccupied with the idea of the economy
as a complete system, with all phenomena interdependent on each other.
The graphical construction of the misleadingly named “Edgeworth Box” by
Pareto (Pareto, 1909, p. 191) can be viewed as the essence of this desire.
Pareto in fact set himself the task of developing a system of laws capable of
describing the behaviour of society as a whole. One of the ﬁrst authors to take
a further step back and to focus on the systemic aspects of the economy, and
to empirically study the price system in particular, was Frederick C. Mills in
his book on The Behavior of Prices (Mills, 1927). The fact that the concept
of a system was not a well-deﬁned mathematical object led to a fascinating
and heated exchange with Jacob Viner to which we shall return in Section
3.5. Rutledge Vining (1984) summarises this exchange by saying that while
for Viner the value of a thing and the theory of what determines its amount
are what economics is about, to Mitchell and Mills the orienting fact is not
the value of a thing but rather the working or performing of an economic
system, of which one of the outcomes are those prices. In the same spirit,
systemic risk is not only the risk that a price or a quantity are outliers, but
rather it is risk associated directly with the machine or mechanism that does
the working and generates prices, allocations and so forth.
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3.1 Appraising Economic and Financial Systems
How often have we heard politicians complaining post 2008 that “the ﬁnancial
system is broken”? For instance, how should one even start to think about the
question of how a given new policy rule would aﬀect an observable statistical
characteristic of systemic risk, or of volatility of prices, or of the fairness and
trust in the ﬁnancial system? In fact, herein lies another crucial distinction,
already advanced by Knight (1947),4 between physical and social systems in
that people agree what it means for a watch to work or for a human body
to be healthy, but such a statement about the economy is much less clear in
reality and a deﬁnition is not obvious.
The literature on systems has progressed since that exchange of opinions in
the 1920s, and authors have expressed the intuitive meanings of the system
concept in more formal forms. For our purposes of studying systemic risk,
and in particular when viewed as a practical endeavour, the work by Vining
(1984) is of direct relevance.5 He tried to see the economic system from the
view of an economist in the role of practitioner, and more precisely in the
role of a specialist advisor to legislators and citizens in a legislative frame
of mind. Partly based on earlier work (Vining, 1969), Vining suggests the
following concepts which we shall adopt also:
Economic System. The something that is said to be working or function-
ing and that can be deliberately modiﬁed is called economic system,
denoted as S := {θ,M}. It is the modiﬁable operating mechanism, or
operating entity, that performs. θ is the set of constraining and pre-
scriptive rules, the “rules of the game” as Frank Knight put it. This θ
is what the legislators alter, not M . A change in θ can be minor in the
sense of not altering the essence of the system (e.g. raising the capital
ratios by a fraction), or a change in θ can alter the functioning of the
4“Individual medicine itself is “scientiﬁc” only to the extent that men agree on the
meaning of health and disease. . . In this ﬁeld, the degree of agreement which is practically
requisite may be taken for granted. In “social medicine,” the case is distinctly to the
contrary; the main problem of realizing social health is that of deﬁning it, of agreeing as
to what is to be striven for. . . The practical problem of achieving . . . a “healthy” society
is not a scientiﬁc or technical one in the proper, instrumentalist sense. To begin with,
it is the very diﬀerent kind of problem involved in formulating, which means rationally
agreeing upon, “rules of the game,” which is not a matter of means and ends.”
5There are a number of similar conceptual frameworks for thinking about comparative
economic systems, including Montias (1976) and Neuberger and Duﬀy (1976).
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system (e.g. breaking up the banks). M is the exogenous statistical
mechanism or generating mechanism that cannot easily be amended by
changing the rules.
While {θ,M} as a conceptual experiment is in practice too vast to
describe as a mathematical object, for concreteness let us say that
M = {(Ω,F , T ,FX ,P), (I, χI ,N ), A}
The elements in M are exogenous and not under the control of the
authorities (and are therefore not also in θ):
(Ω,F , T ,FX ,P) represents the probability space with state space Ω
and the informational structure(s) FX generated over time T by
the exogenous state processes X, such as the endowment pro-
cesses, taste shocks, productivity shocks, etc. These information
structures can diﬀer between agents, including the policy makers.
(I, χI ,N ) represents the set of a-priori agents and institutions I with
given characteristics χI (including types spaces, location and ob-
jective functions) and a-priori network structure of connections
N . This set also includes the given market mechanisms that en-
able trade, i.e. the set of trading venues and their market clearing
mechanisms, be they batch auctions, limit order books, over-the-
counter or dark, etc.
A represents the exogenous elements of the commodities space X and
the securities payoﬀ structure (details of which can be amended
through θ).
Notice that this construction satisﬁes the three deﬁning characteristics
of a system outlined in Section 2. S refers to a central concept by
being a functioning mechanism designed to fulﬁl an economic purpose.
Through M , S also exhibites (possibly endogenous) interrelations be-
tween its components and is a dynamic system, evolving stochastically
over time.
Economy. The physical outcome of the system’s working, which legislators
react to, is the economic reality, for simplicity called the economy. This
outcome is manifested in strictly physical phenomena, though perhaps
not all observable. It is this immense mass of physical things and
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events, populations and processes of events of real elements over space
and time, of which there are observations. It is the physical reality. Let
us denote the economy by πt. In practice – absent lump-sum transfers
and perfect information about agents’ characteristics – the outcome πt
cannot usually be directly modiﬁed by policy makers, only θ can.
Performance Characteristics. The third basic notion is that of a numer-
ical speciﬁcation of the stable (or stationary) properties of the outcome
in terms of which the performance characteristics of an economic sys-
tem are described. πt cannot be observed fully by anybody, instead
the performance vector observable to policy makers is βt. Its compo-
nents numerically specify statistical properties of πt that have acquired
meaning as operating characteristics. In other words, they convey to
responsible persons a sense of how well or badly a currently operating
economic system is working. The functional dependence of βt upon
{θ,M} captures the essence of policy making.6
One is rarely primarily interested in the state of any particular indi-
vidual thing; the central focus is always the statistical properties of
developing populations and processes. The names by which the fea-
tures discussed are called are those of population phenomena: instabil-
ity, concentrations, depression, underdevelopment, imbalance, blight,
industry concentration. In our case, β reﬂects observable aspects of
systemic risk.
Norms. When deciding to change the rules, one has norms in mind against
which the actuality is compared. I paraphrase, but what makes eco-
nomics economics, a social science, is the problem of identifying and
specifying what those norms or standards are against which responsible
observers gauge the actuality that they in fact see. These norms reﬂect
the axiom of economicity.
6Goodhart’s Law (Goodhart, 1975) and Lucas Critique (Lucas, 1976) are accommo-
dated within this framework. If, based on past analysis and observations, we found some
statistical regularities in βt that may be exploited to move the economy in some desirable
direction, once θ is modiﬁed to direct the system in the desired direction, it may well be
that the new βt post change no longer satisﬁes this statistical regularity. This is taken
into account when saying that βt is seen as a mapping from {θ,M}.
10
3.2 On the Policy Maker’s Information System
It is worth emphasising a point made in Bonisch and Di Giammarino (2010)
that in order to monitor and inﬂuence risk in the ﬁnancial system {θ,M} in
actual practice, the policy maker and the supervisors need to have a suﬃ-
ciently complete picture of the overall mechanism M as well as of the policy
mapping θ → β. Since the relevant information about these systems that
constitute M is disaggregated and held by dispersed ﬁnancial participants
who often have a strategic interest in keeping it private, with no partici-
pant having more than a small window on the whole M , in practice this
means that information ﬂows need to be incentive-compatible, intelligently
organised, using the right market variables to infer information about the
mechanism (Mises, 1920; Hayek, 1945) and linked into the policy maker’s
Information System.
Policy makers (for the sake of brevity, we include supervisors and regula-
tors under that heading) currently do not have all the information and data
sets they need. Furthermore, they receive vast amounts of data (“big data”)
that are currently nor explored fully because the information is either simply
gathered with no resources expended on properly analysing it, or it is siloed
inside one of the regulatory bodies, or because the various regulatory bodies
do not communicate properly with each other. The latter is often true at the
national level and certainly at the international level. A shared infrastructure
is required that allows data to be linked, accessed and analysed intelligibly
across policy desks, institutions and jurisdictions. In short, a proper infor-
mation system is required as a replacement for the decentralised collection of
informational silos we currently have.7
As a start, this system needs to be built upon agreed and meaningful uni-
versally accepted standards and suﬃcient statistics carefully chosen for the
systemic risk platform, “encoded into a widely accepted, non-proprietary,
searchable, computer-readable data format” (Bonisch and Di Giammarino,
7Some authors are doubtful whether current and past data as currently gathered would
be suﬃcient to understand how complex evolving systems behave in the future, partly
because some relevant variables are not observable to observers and partly because the
system is changing or the relevant variables cannot be guaranteed to be stationary and
ergodic (or can be made so). For instance, Hayek (1989, p.93) writes that “ the numerical
measurements with which the majority of economists are still occupied today may be of
interest as historical facts, but . . . with the functions of the system these magnitudes have
evidently very little to do.”
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2010; Houstoun, 2012). Incomparable data cannot be strung into an infor-
mation system. Excessive and unstructured data is also of no use to the
regulators. A high-frequency trading company can submit disks with ter-
abytes of data and code to a regulator, but this information is unlikely to be
of much use. Similarly, the 2.5 billion pages of documentation that Goldman
Sachs provided to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission following their re-
quest for information on Goldman’s mortgage derivatives business has been
perceived as wilfully obstructive. A clearer dialogue with investment ﬁrms
that insures a ﬁrmer buy-in would be beneﬁcial.
Finally, it is doubtful that the policy community can fully comprehend and
analyse the ﬁnancial system on its own. In particular, workable and standard-
ised conﬁdentiality clauses need to be established that allow the harnessing
of the academic community.
3.3 On Performance Characteristics βt.
All particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern
they jointly constitute.
Polanyi (1962, p.57)
In order to appreciate the meaning of β in relation to π and {θ,M}, one
can cite Mills (1935) who writes that ultimately it is the overall behaviour
of the economy that is of most interest: “The data of economics (the price
of potatoes on a given day, the rate of interest on a certain date) are the
result of a great number of individual actions, and it is the mass, not the
individual, which concern us. The mass must be studied as a whole, and its
properties as a functioning unit ascertained.”
Similarly, one can cite the physicist Schro¨dinger (1944):
In the course of the last sixty or eighty years, statistical methods
and the calculus of probability have entered one branch of science
after another. (. . . ) On its ﬁrst appearance the new weapon was
mostly accompanied by an excuse: it was only to remedy our
shortcoming, our ignorance of details or our inability to cope
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with vast observational material. (. . . ) In textbooks on gas-
theory it has become a stock phrase, that statistical methods are
imposed on us by our ignorance of the initial coordinates and
velocities of single atoms – and by the insurmountable intricacy
of integrating 1023 simultaneous diﬀerential equations, even if we
knew the initial values. (. . . ) But inadvertently, as it were, the
attitudes changed. It dawns upon us that the individual case is
entirely devoid of interest, whether detailed information about it
is obtainable or not, whether the mathematical problem it sets
can be coped with or not. (. . . ) The working of the statistical
mechanism itself is what we are really interested in.
Herbert Simon, when discussing weak emergence, agrees with this when he
says (Simon, 1996, p.171):“ ‘Weak emergence’ shows up in a variety of ways.
In describing a complex system we often ﬁnd it convenient to introduce the-
oretical terms, like inertial mass in mechanics, or voltage in the theory of
circuits, for quantities that are not directly observable but are deﬁned by
relations among the observables. We often use such terms to avoid reference
to details of the component subsystems, referring only to their aggregate
properties.” Weather forecasting, for instance, does not attempt to forecast
the behaviour of each molecule but rather a distribution of pressure across
space and time and whether or not we can expect rain in London on Tuesday
afternoon. The answer to which is typically yes.
The same interest in the performance of the overall system exists in the social
sciences. Hayek (1976, chapter 10) writes that: “the eﬀorts of the legislator
can thus be directed only towards increasing the chances for all, not in the
sense that the incidence of the diﬀused eﬀects of his decision on the various
individuals will be known, but only in the sense that he can aim at increas-
ing the opportunities that will become available to some unknown persons.”
This should be clear to anybody observing modern computer based equities
markets for example (see Linton et al., 2013, for an in-depth analysis). It is
likely that no one entity has access to all the quotes and all the transactions
between all the players across all markets – lit and dark, OTC and organised
– across all securities. These outcomes of the price system are represented
by an element of πt. Instead, when policy makers try to ﬁgure out whether a
larger minimum tick size would be a step in the right direction, they would
like to compare summary statistics, such as market price and limit order
book stability, overall transaction costs, the typical time it takes to oﬄoad
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a large position within a given price impact bound, the degree of conﬁdence
of ﬁnal investors in the markets, the typical perceived market quality, the
evenness of the playing ﬁeld, etc., of the current regime θ with those of the
proposed new regime θ′. In other words, they are not deliberating about the
mapping from {θ,M} to a πt but to a βt.
The same applies to the central question in Allen and Gale (2000) on com-
paring ﬁnancing systems. The authors did not intend to ﬁnd out how each
individual’s situation and actions would change at any moment in time if
an economy moved from a market-based ﬁnancing system θ to a banking-
based ﬁnancing system θ′ as reﬂected in πt, but rather what the overall
eﬃciency gains and losses are, the quality and extent of risk sharing, the
ease with which ﬁrms can raise of raising ﬁnancing for new projects etc., as
reﬂected in βt. Neither did the many authors who analysed the transition
from command-based economies to a free economy system attempt to predict
the detailed outcome of the transition for everyone and everything (see for
instance Mandy (1992) and Anderson and Kegels (1998)).
Herein also lies one of the more telling failures of much of mainstream ﬁnan-
cial thinking that underlies recent ﬁnancial regulations, such as Basel II, III
etc., namely the fallacy of composition. It is not true that the ﬁnancial sys-
tem is safe if each ﬁnancial institution is safe (see Danielsson et al. (2001) for
an early warning). One cannot easily deduct a property of an aggregate from
the property of the elements that make up the aggregate, precisely because
individual elements interact with each other and with the constraints of the
problem in a way that aggregation can profoundly alter the characteristics.
The recognition of this fact during the ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2007
led to the design of “macroprudential regulation” to complement traditional
“microprudential regulation.”
3.4 System of Systems
Vining says that once one empirically studies the thing that does the working
and the statistical properties of some population process, it would then follow
that the working part of this system consists of a collection of statistical
mechanisms. In other words, the world might be best viewed as a system
of systems. Nevertheless, one has a need to analyse parts of the system
without analysing everything. For instance, when analysing the banking
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system, and depending on the precise questions one is asking, one may be
required to abstract ﬁrst from the interactions with other systems, and then
only interrelate the systems at a second stage.
This idea is also related to what Simon (1996) calls a hierarchic nearly de-
composable system: “By a hierarchic system I mean a system that is com-
posed of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being in turn hierarchic
in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem. In
most systems in nature it is somewhat arbitrary as to where we leave oﬀ the
partitioning and what subsystems we take as elementary. . . At the moment
we shall accept the fact that scientists do this all the time and that, if they
are careful scientists, they usually get away with it . . . As a second approx-
imation we may move to a theory of nearly decomposable systems, in which
the interactions among the subsystems are weak but not negligible.” We now
study a few such subsystems of the overall economic system in more detail.
3.5 Example: Price System
We have already seen in Section 3 that Mills and Viner were engaged in
an intellectual battle over the meaning of a “price system,” as opposed to
“prices.” Mills’ objective was:
to secure a fuller understanding of the numerous relations, of
varying degrees of intimacy, which tie all prices into a system
– “a highly complex system of many parts connected with each
other in diverse ways, a system inﬁnitely ﬂexible in detail yet
stable in the essential balance of its interrelations, a system like a
living organism in its ability to recover from the serious disorder
into which it periodically falls.8”
Yet, in spite of the numbers of factors and the complexity of
the facts, there is hope of ﬁnding regularities in the ﬁeld to be
studied. It was one of the more fruitful scientiﬁc discoveries of
modern times that regularities appear even when sheer chance
rules. Though in the realm of chance the individual event may be
unpredictable, deﬁnite principles of order prevail among groups
of such events. . . The price system seems to furnish a striking and
8Quoted by Mills from Mitchell (1913) (p. 31).
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curious illustration of such a tendency in the realm of economics,
a tendency of which there is, perhaps, a rational explanation.
. . .
The isolated prices that were quoted in the dawn of the money
economy must have been connected to other prices by ties that
were but feeble and remote, and the circle within which the inﬂu-
ence of a given price transaction was felt must have been a very
narrow one. But as the money economy developed these ties
increased in number and in strength. Small net-works of price
relations expanded and established contacts with other such net-
works. The price system grew until the mesh of price relations
included, as it does today, all industrialized communities. While
this “mutual assimilation” was taking place, those regularities
which, in Peirce’s view, constitute the “habits” of nature were
coming into existence. Characteristic modes of behavior were
being impressed upon various groups of prices by underlying nat-
ural forces, by the pressure of competition, by factors connected
with the business cycle, and by other agencies the eﬀects of which
probably cannot be traced in detail. And the process by which
price ties have been formed and by which characteristic modes of
behavior have been acquired still goes on.
. . .
If the price system could be fully explored, if all ties and connec-
tions could be traced and all ﬂuctuations explained, then, per-
haps, man could understand and control the economic system he
has created. We can doubtless come much closer to that objective
than we now are. It is doubtful, in a changing world, that it will
ever be attained.
In this quote, we can see that Mills literally describes the price system as
a complex dynamic system exhibiting emergent properties brought about
by interrelations and networks. Since at the time of writing (1927) general
equilibrium theory was still in its infancy and neither the tools of economic
dynamics, nor of complexity theory, nor of network theory had been available,
it is no wonder that his views were met by scepticism. In a critical article as
a response to Mills on the deﬁnition of a system, Viner said (Viner, 1929),
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and the discussion9 in (Bye, 1940, esp. pages 209 and 214):
For the price theorist, the points of outstanding interest in this
volume are: the faith expressed by the author in the existence of
a “price system;” his description of the characteristics of such a
system; and his conﬁdence that his method of analysis is adapted
to, and that his investigation has contributed to, the demonstra-
tion of its existence. The outstanding contribution which the
volume achieves is the reduction to precision and measurability
of concepts that economists generally use vaguely and loosely. It
is therefore unfortunate that the reader is given so little help in
determining just what constitutes a “system” of prices and how
one is to know when the “order,” the “regularities and unifor-
mities,” which are apparently the criteria of a “system,” have
been discovered in suﬃcient degree to warrant conﬁdence in its
existence.
. . .
I think you speak of the “price system.” . . . The word “system”
is nowhere deﬁned. I would like a discussion of the concept of
“system” . . . . That is one of my stumbling blocks.
Vining explains why a price system is not a population of prices, or a price
vector, but rather the thing that does the working that generates the price
vector in the ﬁrst place:
The thing whose properties are being described is a random pro-
cess of events in geographic space and time. The thing upon
which measurements are actually made for an estimation of these
properties is a kind of population – but not a population of prices.
A price, being a number, is a measured characteristic of an el-
ement of a quasi-population in question and is not itself an ele-
ment. . .Mills’ data covered a period of some 36 years. During this
period, billions upon billions of transactions occurred as events,
each having a momentary existence at some time and place and
9It is telling that in 1940, 13 years after Mills’ publication, the Social Science Research
Council organised a conference and published a book (Bye, 1940) on the appraisal of Mills’
The Behavior of Prices.
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each involving an exchange of goods for money. That which bears
the name price is a variable deﬁned upon this event and whose
value is given by the ratio of the number of units of money to the
number of units of goods exchanged in that transaction. . . . But
the primary reality is the transactions themselves, occurring as
events in time and geographic space. It is this process of events
that manifests the properties that Mills adapted his data to de-
scribe.
We view this as saying that what matters is not a collection of prices, or even
of prices over time, but that a price system, being the performing mechanism,
represents the entire price mapping, as used in ﬁnance, intermediated by a
connecting tissue of demand and supply functions:
P : X × Π → RN
where the space X is the space of all transactions, i.e. a space labelling
the commodities (including time, trade counterparties, spatial and any other
properties), and Π regroups the given structure, including the probability
space (Ω,F , T ,FX ,P) with the (exogenous) driving state processes X de-
ﬁned on it, the institutions, the policy environment, the set of agents and
their interrelations, their motivations and beliefs, the informational struc-
ture including expectations formation and learning, the type of auctioning
mechanism used (e.g. batch auction, limit order book), etc.
There is no reason to assume that there is one centralised market clearing
auctioneer, and the speciﬁcation allows for a more realistic “economy of mar-
kets” in lieu of a “market economy” in the taxonomy of Allais (1967).10 A
quick glance at modern markets, both for Mars bars and for ﬁnancial se-
curities, conﬁrms the view that the same commodity or the same ﬁnancial
security is traded at any moment in time at many diﬀerent prices.
10Allais writes in his Nobel speech “During the winter of 1966-1967, I was led to discard
the Walrasian general model of the market economy, characterized at any time, whether
there be equilibrium or not, by a single price system, the same for all the operators, - a
completely unrealistic hypothesis, - and to establish the theory of economic evolution and
general equilibrium, of maximum eﬃciency, and of the foundations of economic calculus,
on entirely new bases resting on the concept of distributable surplus which I had elaborated
and used in my 1943 book, and on a new model, the model of the economy of markets (in
the plural).”
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So the price system is a S := {θ,M} where the mechanism M is the entire
price formation process, including those elements Π0 of Π that are exogenous
and that cannot be readily aﬀected by policy actions as well as those elements
θ of Π that can be amended via a policy choice.
Also,
πt = {(P (X ))(t), all transactions details} , and
βt = observable (incl. statistical) properties of πt
As argued above, observation is incomplete, ﬁrst because much of the data is
not observable by any one entity. Furthermore, what matters to the policy
maker are statistical observations, such as price stability, ﬁnancial stability,
risk, fairness and transparency which are features of a price system, not of a
price vector.
A price system is a working thing, it is functioning. Its functions are to clear
markets, allowing uncountable decisions taken each day by consumers and
businesses to interact and to become compatible, determining the allocation
of scarce resources between competing uses. In other words, they provide a
rationing function when there is a shortage (rationing of demand) or an excess
(rationing of supply). They provide a signalling function to guide investors,
producers and individuals in their decisions. They also help in reﬁning one’s
information. Nowadays these operations are made more explicit through the
term price formation process.
In terms of emergence, the interrelations between commodities or transac-
tions are obvious. There are substitution, income, wealth and informational
eﬀects, complementarities in production and consumption, common factors
and the like. How do these interrelations substantiate themselves in terms
of emergence as deﬁned above? Observing in a Walrasian economy the (par-
tial equilibrium) excess aggregate demand functions for each commodity i
separately as the mapping pi → Zi(pi; ·), being unaware of the variables
represented as the ·, one knows the demand functions for each commodity
separately as a function of its own price, but not as a function of all other
prices and common factors. In other words, one can attempt to deduce, for
each i separately, pi : Zi(pi; ·) = 0, giving us a price vector (p1, . . . , pn), but
this price vector is not the same as the functioning mechanism that brings
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parties together, discovers values by also considering substitutes, clears mar-
kets and reallocates resources to more valuable uses. As pointed out by
Walras (1874) in his criticism of partial equilibrium analysis (and of the as-
sumption of a constant marginal utility of money), what is missing is what
joins the economy together, what makes it function by reallocating resources
across commodities and agents. What is missing is the reference to the axiom
of economicity, and therefore the mechanism as described above would not
function properly since surplus goes to waste. At the same time, the reference
attribute is missing, since commodities are not all compared simultaneously
to a common yardstick of value, such as cash or a nume´raire commodity.
Price systems and aggregate demand functions exhibit further emergent prop-
erties that are diﬃcult to deduce from the behaviour of individual demand
functions. For instance, the Law of Demand states that the aggregate de-
mand for any bundle of commodities is monotonically decreasing in its price.
Evidently the Law of Demand holds in aggregate if each individual’s demand
satisﬁes monotonicity, but more interestingly there are conditions on the
distribution of endowments across agents that guarantee that the aggregate
demand is monotonic even though these restrictions do not guarantee that
individual demand functions are monotonic (see for instance Hildenbrand
(1983) and Chiappori (1985)). Alternatively, de Villemeur (2001) has shown
that given a certain distribution of preferences, there are (restrictive) classes
of economies for which none of the individual demand functions satisfy the
Law of Demand while the aggregate does. Later on we shall see that systemic
risk is to some extent related to the complementary situation whereby indi-
vidual reactions to price changes do not cancel each other out and thereby
do not guarantee the aggregate Law of Demand (since the Law of Demand
implies uniqueness of equilibrium and stability), but instead reinforce each
other through some institutional arrangements to lead to upward-sloping de-
mand functions that correspond to some form of instability in that, in an
appropriate dynamic sense, higher prices lead to a larger demand which in
turn leads to higher prices and so forth.
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3.6 Example: Payment and Clearing System
Payment systems11 such as the UK CHAPS (the Bank of England assumes
the role as operator of the underlying RTGS processor) or the European TAR-
GET 2 system (operated by the Eurosystem, of which CHAPS is a member)
satisfy the deﬁnition of a system in that a collection of payers, receivers and
transactions are weaved into a network of operations with a central mecha-
nism operating in order to fulﬁl one of the most crucial functions in ﬁnance.
The central role is taken up by the payment processor or clearing house. This
role is often played by a central bank, but payment systems have existed prior
to central banks and many clearing systems have at their centre a privately
owned entity that settles in commercial bank money (as opposed to central
bank base money).
The reason why the payment function calls for a system is that the payment
functions are naturally best served in a network with a centre, a system
in our deﬁnition. Jevons (1875) (see Figure 1) explains how a decentralised
payment mechanism with multiple banks quickly becomes absurd if payments
were to be settled by the carrying about of coin, and that it is suﬃcient to
“appoint, as it were, a bankers’ bank to hold a portion of the cash of each
bank, and then the mutual indebtedness may be balanced oﬀ.” The principle
of economicity that calls for an economising of resources drives the desire for
a central payment hub, and hence for a payment system.
Given this diﬃculty of moving coin, in the UK the payment business has
found a solution with a central entity and became a proper “system” in about
1775 when “a few of the city bankers hired a room where their clerks could
meet to exchange notes and bills, and settle their mutual debts. This society
was of a nature of a strictly private and secret club. . . . Although it remains
a private and voluntary association, unchartered, and in fact unknown to
the law, the Clearing House has steadily grown in importance and in the
publicity of its proceedings. . . . The Bank of England long remained entirely
outside of the confederation, but more recently it has become a member, so
far as regards the presentation of claims upon other banks.”
11A check system is a special sort of payment system based on paper-based debit in-
struments, called checks. Such payment systems are still widespread in many parts of
the world, and they harbour extra diﬃculties, see BIS (2001). Knight (1956) for instance
writes that “the object for which check system is the name is not a population of checks.”
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Figure 1: Clearing System
Jevons (1875) describes on p. 261 the clearing system in the UK at
the time. Bank customers are labelled by lower case letters and they
bank with local banks, labelled P to W . A depositor a, client of bank
P , wishes to pay depositor r, a client of bank U. a sends a cheque
to r who deposits it into his account with bank U . U forwards it to
its London-based correspondence bank Y who presents it through the
Clearing House to X, who debits it to P . “Nothing can exceed the
simplicity and perfection of this arrangement.”
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Similarly in the US, before the Fed and the Fed Funds interbank lending
market, banks created as a central mechanism a kind of primitive repo system
to transfer funds around the banking system in an attempt to create a single
big-bank approximation (see Mehrling, 2011).
Because a systemic event in the payment system may lead quickly to banking
illiquidity and insolvency and therefore to a banking system event, the pay-
ments system is commonly viewed as a source of systemic risk to the entire
ﬁnancial and economic system, and beyond. A clear practical application
of this risk to the case of the 1987 crash, with the corresponding ﬂow net-
work of margin calls and margin payments and ultimately the intervention
of the Fed, can be found in Brimmer (1989). Similarly, when the Bank of
New York computer system malfunctioned on 21 and 22 November 1985 and
would not accept incoming payments for a prolonged period, the resultant
illiquidity position soon ballooned to a point where no one counterparty bank
could take on the risk of making a suﬃciently large loan, and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York stepped in with a $22.6 billion discount win-
dow advance, see Volcker and Corrigan (1986). On a bigger scale still, on
11 September 2001 banks experienced diﬃculties in making their payments
because of widespread damage to property and communications systems in
Lower Manhattan. The Federal Reserve responded by supplying abundant
liquidity to the banking system through discount window loans and open
market operations – actions that helped restore payments coordination (see
McAndrews and Potter, 2002). A paper by Afonso and Shin (2009) provides
a formal model to think about systemic risk in payment systems.
3.7 Example: International Financial System?
If today the daily central interbank clearing and settlement process provides
a centre for the clearing of the banking interrelationships within a given
jurisdiction, can one speak of an international payment and banking system?
Furthermore, with oﬀshore credit and money creation, can one say that the
set of national and supranational central banks – even if viewed as one –
truly are able to control the global money supply?
To some extent, whether there is an eﬀective central international clearing
process is an empirical question. National CBs play a special role in the
safety of payment systems given their role of providing settlement accounts
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nearly free of default risk and their ability to inject currency in a crisis event.
But even if the interbank settlements can be done locally in a network of such
facilities, there is no World Central Bank that can inject intraday liquidity
in an elastic fashion. Is this a role the IMF or the World Bank can eﬀectively
fulﬁl?
Even within Europe in 2013, the European banking landscape is still frag-
mented due to local regulatory, supervisory and resolution arrangements,
due to multiple CBs and LOLRs, and due to disparate deposit guarantee
schemes subjected to guarantees, some partly funded and most unfunded, by
the national taxpayers in the absence of a European Banking Union. While
banks operate cross-border, the segmentations create a banking sector that
may not fully function like a system in the absence of both a banking union
and a ﬁscal union (Jassaud, 2009), in which case it would indicate ineﬃ-
cient functioning and prone to more violent reinforcing feedback loops than
otherwise. {
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value of state guarantees weakens







Only a banking union makes the array of banks into a coherent system. But
since banks hold sovereign debt of other countries, even a banking union
cannot break the loop unless there is a ﬁscal union (e.g. ESM), for the
failure of a sovereign still causes trouble to banks in other countries, which
will put pressure on those other local sovereigns in the absence of a ﬁscal
union. More details can be found in Danielsson (2013).
The question of the importance of a ﬁscal union in the functioning of an
international ﬁnancial system – as opposed to a collection of local banking
systems or local payment systems – is not a recent one. For instance, Dupriez
(1976) and Goodhart (1999) study whether international bodies, such as the
IMF, can act as international LOLR, thereby giving the international banking
sector a centre and coherence. Goodhart concludes that since international
bodies are at a crucial disadvantage compared with national CBs (for instance
neither the IMF nor the ECB have a single government standing behind it
with international powers and taxing authority, and on top of that the IMF
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cannot issue its own ﬁat liabilities): “For the time being the considerable
(and even surprising) extent of segmentation in national ﬁnancial systems
within Europe will enable the present system of crisis resolution being centred
on national institutions to continue (with the ECB playing a consultative,
overseeing and advisory role). Once the European ﬁnancial system becomes
more integrated, the dysjunction between a centralised, federal monetary
system and decentralised national ﬁscal powers will become more diﬃcult
to reconcile. It will be interesting to observe how this dysjunction will be
resolved in future.”
Given that there is no universal supranational currency with its clearing
settlement agency and lender of last resort having the power to create supra-
national money elastically, not much seems to have happened since the com-
plaints by Keynes (1943), and it is hard to disagree as a result that the world
ﬁnancial system is not functioning as eﬃciently and safely as it could. The
Asian crisis of 1998 provides a good example and the role of the IMF as an
international lender of last resort during this episode is discussed further in
Danielsson (2013).
4 Our Approach to Systemic Risk
What makes the subject of systemic risk so fascinating, and diﬃcult, is the
same thing that makes economics in general so fascinating and so diﬃcult,
and this something (which will return under the guise of the fallacy of com-
position in a subsequent section) is what Friedman (1980) had in mind when
he said:
The great mistake everyone makes is to confuse what is true for
the individual with what is true for society as a whole. This is
the most fascinating thing about economics. In a way, economics
is the most trivial subject in the world, and yet it is so hard for
people to understand. Why? I believe a major reason is because
almost any interesting economic problem has the following char-
acteristic: what is true for the individual is the opposite of what
is true for everybody together.
While aggregate constraints imposed upon a system are at the heart of the
problem, and call for a general equilibrium approach, the mapping between
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the individual and the aggregate itself is far from trivial because it is subject
to nonlinear feedback loops and complex interrelationships. The explicit
analysis of this mapping constitutes our approach to systemic risk.
4.1 Feedback Loops
We have mentioned the necessarily tight link between systemic risk and
endogenous risk, especially endogenous risk of the positive feedback loop
sort. The latter takes the economy outside of a damping or Central-Limit-
Theorem-cancelling of eﬀects, and into complex systems. The recognition
of the importance of feedbacks goes back a long way to the work of von
Bertalanﬀy (Bertalanﬀy, 1950, 1968) and especially of Wiener (1948) who
formalised the notion of feedback and control, and who coined the term cy-
bernetics. While the physical sciences latched on to negative feedback loops
as regulating, self-regulating and equilibrating forces, largely cancelling out
positive feedback loops in a display of homeostasis, less thought in the natural
sciences was invested into large scale positive feedback loops. While positive
local feedback loops have been part-and-parcel in the biological studies for a
long time, overall stability prevailed.12
In terms of global dynamics, the article by Maruyama (1963) has tried to
refocus research on positive feedback and he even suggested to extend cy-
bernetics into a second branch of cybernetics dealing with positive feedback
systems. In the biological sciences, many destructive positive feedback loops
were subsequently uncovered in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, the cir-
culatory system typically balances positive and negative feedback loops and
manages to counteract small perturbations and restore normal functioning.
However, when a larger shock perturbs, it can drive the circulatory system
into a regime where homeostatic forces no longer operate and where the ini-
tial shock gets ampliﬁed, possibly until the system gets destroyed. Consider
for instance the runaway condition of explosive heat death whereby an initial
loss of water from the circulatory system causes a thickening of the blood,
reducing the body’s cooling rate and accelerating the heat built-up. As an-
other example, a massive loss of blood weakens the heart by decreasing its
blood supply, slowing down the rate of pumping, and hence the circulation
12The relationship between positive feedback loops and stability can be subtle and de-
pends on the deﬁnition of positive feedback loops, see Ashby (1956).
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of blood, which weakens the heart still further. The reader is referred to the
fascinating book by DeAngelis et al. (1980) for many more examples.
Researchers such as Ashby (1947), (von Foerster, 1960, 1974), Prigogine and
Varela et al. (1974), have argued that there is no need to limit one’s anal-
ysis to either negative or positive feedback loops, but that a system can
exhibit both in a self-organised fashion. Such self-organised systems exhibit
dynamics where a displacement does not either blindly revert to the original
situation or explode and die, but where the displacement can lead to the
creation of a new equilibrium order. The various steady-states a system can
ﬁnd itself in is often called an “attractor,” and Ashby (1962)’s principle of
self-organisation states that any system will eventually end up in one of these
attractors. Economists have long understood the dynamics of multiple basins
of attractions in models with multiple equilibria due to external economies
(Krugman, 1991). But one can go further and view the multiple basins not
as multiple equilibria existing simultaneously and of which one is chosen ei-
ther by history or by some rational expectations selection, but as situations
that arise through purposeful higher-level actions and organisation. In that
sense, one can deﬁne a super-system as the entire construct encompassing
what one usually calls a system as well as the endogenous forces that act
upon a displaced system and reorganise (or “self-organise”) it in a new fash-
ion. This idea of a super-system is a natural one in the social sciences where
higher-level negative feedback loops (representing policy interventions, legal
amendments, wars, etc.) tend to ultimately constrain the lower-level posi-
tive feedbacks. Such a super-system would then itself never change,13 and
the local behaviour of the super-system corresponds to the behaviour of the
concrete system we denote by S := {θ,M}.
4.2 Short Historical Background on Positive Feedback
Loops in Economics
There is no doubt that negative feedback loops play an important role in
ﬁnance and economics, preserving the structure of systems over long periods
of time. Also, much of the empirical academic work on the economy relies
13Consequently, there can never be a risk to the super-system if one considers it closed
and all-encompassing, the risk merely reﬂects the likelihood that the super-system can
ﬁnd itself in a bad system state S := {θ,M}.
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on stationarity induced by the stabilising forces of negative feedback loops,
and so does much of theory through the assumption of mean-reverting driv-
ing processes (e.g. Cox et al., 1985). Endogenous crises and dysfunctional
episodes, however, do not ﬁnd an obvious place in this literature.
It is interesting that Maruyama (1963) writes that his work on the second
cybernetics has been inspired by economists, in particular by Myrdal (1957).
Myrdal described how in an underdeveloped laisser-faire economy “the few
privileged people accumulate more wealth and power while the living stan-
dard of the poor tends to fall. Low standard of living, poor health, and low
eﬃciency in work aggravate one another. Racial or social discrimination, and
other social, psychological and cultural factors may be added in the ‘vicious
circle.”’
In the study of economics, positive feedback loops appeared much earlier still,
for instance in Quesnay’s tableau e´conomique14 and in Smith (1776)15 while
Ricardo and Malthus formalised positive feedback loops. Malthus (1798)
describes that more production sustains a larger population, and that with a
larger population, more production is possible, which ideally results in ever
greater growth and productivity.16
A monetary feedback loop was identiﬁed by Wicksell (1898), the so-called
cumulative process. If the banking system (including the central bank) pushes
the rate of interest below the natural market equilibrium rate, the quantity of
loans demanded swells and is met by the creation of additional bank money.
14Quesnay (1766) analysed the circular ﬂows of ﬁnancial funds in an agricultural king-
dom and the resulting feedbacks through a network of classes (producers, rentiers and a
sterile class) of citizens. In his own words, “L’inte´reˆt du cultivateur est le premier ressort
de toutes les ope´rations e´conomiques et de tous les succe`s de l’agriculture; plus les pro-
ductions sont constamment a` haut prix, plus le retour annuel des reprises des fermiers est
assure´, plus la culture s’accroˆıt, et plus les terres rapportent de revenu, tant par le bon
prix des productions, que par l’augmentation de reproduction annuelle; plus la reproduc-
tion s’accroˆıt, plus les richesses de la nation se multiplient, et plus la puissance de l’Etat
augmente.”
15Hayek (1989, p.93) writes that the division of labour is one of the major factors that
generate self-generating orders due to the mutual adjustment of activities of people who
do not know each other. “This foundation of modern civilization was ﬁrst understood by
Adam Smith in terms of the operation of feedback mechanism by which he anticipated
what we now know as cybernetics.”
16With ﬁnite resources, Malthus however discounts this possibility and argues for a neg-
ative feedback loop in that population would tend to grow geometrically while subsistence
only increases arithmetically.
28
This creation leads to inﬂation, and reduces the real rate even further (since
the nominal rate is held low by banks and central banks). This in turn further
stimulates the demand for loanable funds.
The ﬁscal multiplier, devised by Kahn (1931) and later used by Keynes,
can also be viewed as a reinforcing atemporal feedback loop. In fact, in
his General Theory, Keynes (1936) not only considers the main point of his
General Theory to lie in the destabilising forces that operate in ﬁnancial mar-
kets (further emphasised in his rebuttal of Viner, Keynes (1937)), he deﬁnes
intertemporal cycles in terms of feedback loops that represent endogenous
rupturings of coherence often originating in ﬁnancial usages:
By a cyclical movement we mean that as the system progresses
in, e.g. the upward direction, the forces propelling it upwards at
ﬁrst gather force and have a cumulative eﬀect on one another but
gradually lose their strength until at a certain point they tend to
be replaced by forces operating in the opposite direction; which
in turn gather force for a time and accentuate one another, until
they too, having reached their maximum development, wane and
give place to their opposite.
More recently, while one of the great advocates of borrowing dynamic tools
from physics into economics, Samuelson also warned that positive feedback
loops may arise a fair bit more in economics than in physics (Samuelson,
1947, p.336):
Analytically the pure endogenous cycle is usually likened to the
motion of a frictionless pendulum which satisﬁes a simple Newto-
nian second order diﬀerential equation. Upon closer examination
diﬃculties appear with this notion. In the ﬁrst place, all damp-
ening must be ruled out or else the cycle will come to an end;
similarly, in most theories anti-dampening or explosive behaviour
is ruled out. Now in a physical system there are grand “conserva-
tion” laws of nature that guarantee that the system must fall on
the thin line between dampening and anti-dampening, between
stability and anti-stability. But there is nothing in the economic
world corresponding to these laws, and so it would seem inﬁnitely
improbable that the coeﬃcients and structural relations of the
system be just such as to lead to zero dampening.
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Economic systems are subjected to both compensating and cumulative pro-
cesses. But reinforcing loops need not always be welfare deleterious. For
instance, endogenous growth is one example of a cumulative process. Romer
(1986), Lucas (1988b) and Arthur (1989) (and subsequently elaborated in
Arthur (1990)) provided instances of reinforcing loops based upon instances
of increasing returns: “Under increasing returns, by contrast many outcomes
are possible. Insigniﬁcant circumstances become magniﬁed by positive feed-
backs to ‘tip’ the system into the actual outcome ‘selected.’ The small events
of history become important.” This last point, that an economy kicked in
the right direction with a small but suﬃcient push can lead to a resulting
developments that is disproportionately large compared to the initial push,
has been observed by Myrdal already.
The empirical assessment of feedback loops is a delicate econometric (and
philosophical) matter pertaining to the concept of “causality” that is outside
the scope of this note. Amongst the methods used in practice one ﬁnds
nonrecursive simultaneous equation models (see e.g. Simon (1953) and Strotz
and Wold (1960) for a survey of the issues, or Paxton et al. (2011) for a
non-technical modern introduction) and tools based on spectral methods
(Granger, 1969).
4.3 Interrelationships and Nonlinear Dynamics
Macro outcomes are hard to ﬁgure out, predict and forecast because of the
manifold interrelationships and the (possibly resultant) nonlinearities that re-
inforcing feedback loops can induce. The two themes of interrelationships and
feedback loops are closely knit together, for in the absence of interrelations,
some eﬀects cannot bounce back from further aﬁeld or are cancelled by oﬀset-
ting eﬀects. If that happens, individual eﬀects cannot gather momentum to
create amplifying movements and multiplier eﬀects through macroeconomic
complementary and cumulative processes. Progress is halted prematurely,
see Mandy (1990). In that sense, one can view interrelationships as a mech-
anism that strengthens positive feedback loops. These interrelations can
be purely economic, such as balance sheet intermediated, informational or
market-based (e.g. via prices of commonly held asset), or they can be social.
There is a growing literature on social interactions, both local and global, that
studies how small diﬀerences in fundamentals can lead to large diﬀerences in
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aggregate social or economic variables through social multiplier eﬀects. These
multipliers can arise because of positive complementarities in agents’ utility
functions, whereby the utility to an agent of undertaking an action increases
with the number of agents undertaking the same action (e.g. Schelling, 1971,
1972, 1978; Ellison, 1993; Morris, 1997; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000; Brock
and Durlauf, 2001). Froot et al. (1992) applied the idea to ﬁnance by allowing
the asset demand by one investor to induce others to purchase shares.
Large changes in outcomes can also arise from small parameter changes be-
cause of thresholds and phase transitions resulting from the way the pa-
rameters aﬀect the network formation. For instance, in the simple Poisson
network with n nodes studied by Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1961), there are a number
of thresholds for the probability p(n) of nodes forming a given link. If the
probability crosses such a threshold, the network exhibits completely diﬀer-
ent emergent properties for large enough n, such as having links at all, having
at least one component with three nodes, cycles emerging, possessing a giant
component, being connected, etc. In Poisson networks, the network forma-
tion process p(n) is exogenous and probabilities are independent, insuring
that for large n the distributive properties become Poisson. In preferen-
tial attachment models (see Price, 1965) on the other hand, the network is
growing through new nodes and links, with the probability of a node having
a new link being larger the more links the node already has. The degree
distribution in such networks, called “scale-free networks,” is approximately
a power distribution, exhibiting fatter tails than Poisson networks. One of
the avenues to be explored by ﬁnancial economists is an attempt to micro-
found these complementarities and connections through more ﬁnance–based
mechanisms and to combine the local with the market interactions.
When such interactions are viewed as occurring over time, nonlinear dynam-
ics appear. Nonlinearities played an important role in modelling economic
dynamics in the 1940s and 1950s until linear stochastic diﬀerence equations
began to dominate the literature in the 1960s (see Scheinkman, 1990, for
an insightful analysis). More recently, however, nonlinear diﬀerence and dif-
ferential equations have taken the front stage again following the discovery
of simple chaotic systems (e.g. the logistic map studied by May (1974) or
the related tent map) and of non-market interaction models (e.g. random
ﬁeld models (e.g. Follmer, 1974; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000)). These
approaches emphasise the sensitive dependence on initial conditions and on
parameters as well as the emergence of macro phases. Complexity again ap-
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pears, this time due to the interactions through time of the driving processes:
one can easily describe how the system moves from today to tomorrow, but
predicting what the system will look like in a few time steps is very hard
even in the absence of any randomness. Nonlinear systems, possibly based
on interactions,17 therefore have the advantage of being able to capture sen-
sitivity to initial conditions and ampliﬁcation while remaining conﬁned to
a bounded region, an empirically desirable feat that linear systems cannot
achieve.
4.4 Deﬁnition
From these observations that shocks can get around the normal homeostatic
forces, the system runs the risk that the repercussions feed back into hugely
destructive behaviour. In that light, one may deﬁne systemic risk18 as (also
see Hendricks (2009), IMF, BIS and FSB (2009) and Bu¨scher (2011)):
Deﬁnition 1 (Systemic Risk) Systemic Risk is the risk of an event –
labelled a systemic event – occurring in a given system (θ,M) that leads,
at least temporarily, to an altered and damaged transitional “system” (θ,M ′)
whose proper functioning is impeded. In the extreme, the structure of the
system itself is damaged and the system no longer functioning.
Endogenous Systemic Risk refers to the risk of a systemic event where, in
addition, the forces that drive the build-up of the systemic event or the forces
that are responsible for the destructive transitions in the damaged system
once the systemic event is realised, are positive feedback loops and/or cascades
within the system that cannot be adequately kept in check.
We would like to make the following clarifying remarks related to this deﬁ-
nition.
17In Bak et al. (1993) for instance, independent sectoral shocks create aggregate ﬂuctu-
ations that exhibit self-organised criticality, even if the number of sectors grows large (and
one could therefore have guessed that the independent shocks wash out in aggregate).
18While the term “systemic fragility” goes back at least to Minsky (1977b) and the term
“systemic vulnerability” to Cline (1982), it appears that the expression “systemic risk”
in the academic literature was coined at the onset of the Latin American sovereign debt
crisis of the early 1980s in Cline (1984) (see Ozgo¨de (2011) for an account of this period),
although the term has not been further deﬁned or clariﬁed in those works.
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Remark 1. We follow common usage and deﬁne the risk to be downside risk,
i.e. damage or even breakdown to and by the system.
Remark 2. A system that is damaged and no longer functioning properly is
strictly speaking not really a system as deﬁned earlier, hence the quotation
marks around “system.” The damage can occur during the transition back to
the original equilibrium only, or the damage can occur during the transition
to a new “damaged” order as well as so long as the system remains in this
dysfunctional state, or possibly forever if the transition leads to the death of
the system.
Remark 3. Contrary to common usage of the term in the economic or ﬁ-
nancial literature, any system can suﬀer from systemic risk, not just crucial
systems such as the banking system. We follow standard usage of the term
“systemic risk” by restricting it to serious risks to systems that matter in
terms of social welfare, that is systems that society depends on in a mean-
ingful way. In that sense, the ill-functioning system has repercussions for
the economic environment, often coined the “real economy,” in which it is
embedded.
Remark 4. In that sense, the deﬁnition requires judgment in a case-by-case
manner as to whether any given event is “destructive enough.” This it shares
with many other deﬁnitions in economics where thresholds are necessarily
blurred. What is the critical threshold that makes an instrument money, a
bank undercapitalised, a portfolio under-diversiﬁed, a budget deﬁcit unsus-
tainable, a portfolio illiquid, an economy in recession, a cancellation rate on
a public limit order book excessive, an income distribution unjust, an indus-
try too concentrated, a risk systemic? Still, this does not render systemic
risk unmeasurable, provided a reasonable threshold has been chosen. Such a
threshold ought to be neither too low (crying wolf too often and losing the
required commitment) nor too high (leading agents to disregard the possi-
bility of the event), and the ex-ante probabilities of a serious systemic event
as deﬁned here ought to reﬂect this threshold.
Remark 5. Those deﬁnitions inherited from the engineering and the critical
infrastructure protection literatures naturally emphasise the “to” rather than
the “by,” whereas the social sciences emphasise the fact that systemic risks
do not simply exist, but that they are made “by” humans and can be shaped
“by” human choices in the present (for a short survey, see Cavelty (2011)).
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We have deliberately chosen to focus on endogenous systemic risk, the risk
that a given shock leads to destructive feedback loops (and to a loss of diver-
sity with an endogenously coordinated vanishing risk appetite) and therefore
to a large shock to the system as a whole in an endogenous fashion, as op-
posed to one extreme exogenous shock destroying part of the system directly,
along the lines summarised for instance in Barro and Ursu´a (2012).19 See
Danielsson et al. (2012) for a more in-depth analysis of exogenous versus
endogenous extreme events, and for a discussion of atemporal (where the
feedback loops are realised atemporally in one go) and intertemporal (where
the eﬀects occur sequentially over time, possibly with delays) feedback loops.
Remark 6. A feedback loop and a cascade can be seen as isomorphic since
a cascade is a Markov chain and a feedback loop can be represented as an
inﬁnite Markov chain with the same state variables repeatedly appearing
along the chain.
Remark 7. Given the complexity involved in deﬁning systemic events, per-
haps the hope of measuring the systemic event probabilistically is too much
to ask for, and Hansen (2012) argues that instead one may wish to pur-
sue a research agenda attempting to quantify systemic uncertainty instead,
referring to the distinction by Knight (1921) and others.
Remark 8. The deﬁnition above deﬁnes a systemic event as the event where
the destructive forces are unleashed. When fully speciﬁed, the description of
the systemic event includes the description of the build-up of imbalances prior
to the unleashing of the crash, the “systemic build-up event” so to speak.
For instance, the systemic event E not only speciﬁes the event whereby a
loss to a small sector, say the subprime sector, snowballs into a full-blown
banking crisis, but the states in E also correspond to states that witnessed the
19This distinction has already been made by Pareto (1909) in his discussion of economic
crises (in particular p. 531) where he writes that “Crises have two main types of causes,
namely: (α) Any objective change in the conditions of production, if extensive enough,
can give rise to a crisis. The food shortages of former times were related to this cause. (β)
Subjective synchronism of economic movements turn movements which otherwise would
have given rise to smaller displacements of the economic equilibrium into intense crises.”
To what can be described as Pareto’s version of an endogenous crisis, characterised by
sudden synchronised actions that no longer cancel each others out but all synchronise, we
add the further reinforcing characteristic of positive feedback loops and the concomitant
non-linearities to constitute an endogenous systemic crisis. This diﬀerence also forms the
basis for the distinction between systemic risk and aggregate, or systematic, risk in Section
6.
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regulation-induced latent build-up of oﬀ-balance sheet structures that caused
extended bank leveraging with serious maturity mismatches and liquidity
vulnerabilities. Build-up events are further analysed in the next section.
Remark 9. Along the path driven by positive feedback loops, the ﬁnal out-
come can for simplicity be categorised into two groups, depending on the
degree of alteration of the system. First, the hysteretic case20 is one where
the system is hurled down by vicious loops and ends up in a situation (a
so-called attractor) where the system infrastructure is roughly the same as
before the unfolding, albeit with a local system behaviour that is quite dis-
tinct from the one before the event due to the nonlinearities involved. The
formal equations in the model representations also remain the same. As an
example, capital (human, ﬁnancial or real) may be destroyed, but production
exhibits diﬀerent returns to scale, interest rates are very low, the division of
labour and the level of employment have been aﬀected with follow-on reper-
cussions throughout the economy, counterparty exposures have changed, the
political power has gradually shifted, or beliefs now anchor the economy at
a new equilibrium.21 Second, in the structural case, the feedback loops can
lead to a system structure that itself has been profoundly altered. In prac-
tice, the system of equations modelling the economy in the post systemic
event situation is a diﬀerent one.22 The ecology of economic participants
can change, banks for instance can disappear and be replaced by pure mar-
20Systems that are dependent not only on their current environment or state but on the
past environment are often said to exhibit hysteresis or path-dependence.
21Sah (2007) provides the interesting example of corruption induced hysteresis. Depend-
ing on minor shocks to the initial situation whereby by chance more citizens get matched
with more corrupt oﬃcials, the updating of beliefs as to the extent of corruption on behalf
of both oﬃcials and citizens makes them more likely to adopt the corrupt/bribing actions.
The more corruption/bribing occurs, the larger the incentives to extend and accept bribes,
and the positive feedback loop dynamics quickly lead to an equilibrium where the major-
ity of oﬃcials is corrupt and where citizens expect to be facing a corrupt oﬃcial, thereby
self-perpetuating the corrupt state of aﬀairs. The structure of the economy has remained
the same along this path, but the system functions very diﬀerently at the end.
22For instance, when markets become too volatile in Danielsson and Zigrand (2008),
the market mechanism breaks down because this extreme risk cannot be absorbed by the
ﬁnancial sector in aggregate due to binding risk-sensitive regulatory constraints of the
Basel type. Of course, and as mentioned earlier when describing self-organisation, ideally
one would wish all changes, including the structural changes, to be endogenous within
the formal model. In the example just given, one would expect the regulators to amend
the regulatory envelope and to extend permissions to violate Basel rules temporarily for
instance.
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ket solutions, money consists of currency only, laws and regulations change,
OTC transactions are forbidden, industries are nationalised, capital controls
are introduced, and so forth. In the extreme, the new structure no longer
corresponds to a system in light of inconsistencies, say in case the rule of law
breaks down or the rules are contradictory and do not allow a functioning
system. While in the hysteretic case the economy could – perhaps slowly
or upon a solid push – return to its initial state without major structural
changes, it could not in the structural case.
4.5 Mechanisms Creating Systemic Risk in Finance
The destructiveness of the nonlinear dynamics may depend on a variety of
factors, for instance the network structure of exposures and market connec-
tions, the size of balance sheets, leverage, the reliance on short term funding,
the liquidity proﬁle of assets and the capitalisation proﬁle of ﬁnancial institu-
tions. Risk is nonlinear, it often builds up slowly and under the radar screen
as balance sheets expand during periods of moderation with low perceived
risk, only to be violently revealed during a systemic event. This view of crises
has been stated eloquently by Pareto (1909) and later revisited by Crockett
(2000). Pareto writes that “during an upswing everyone is content and no
one talks about a crisis. That period, however, is surely preparing the way
for the downswing which distresses everyone and which alone is given the
name crisis. The upswing normally lasts longer than the downswing. Things
go up little by little, they are hurled down in a single stroke.”
Once the systemic event has obtained and things are hurled down, the func-
tioning of the system is impeded. It may also raise doubts among market
participants, not only about the markets themselves but about the wider
system envelope. On page 13 of Kambhu et al. (2007), Ervin writes about
the 1998 Russian default and the LTCM event: “Investor losses were esti-
mated to be on the order of $100 billion. Every working assumption about
the Russian market came into doubt: the rules, the participants, the prices,
the functioning of markets, even the legal system. This was surely a systemic
crisis for Russia. Moreover, it threatened to become a systemic crisis for the
international ﬁnancial system when the market turmoil aﬀected a particular
hedge fund, LTCM, and the liquidity of core markets in the ﬁnancial system.”
Some of the precise theoretical feedback loops that have been identiﬁed,
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or at least conceived of, have been covered in the historical section 4.2, to
which one can add the following early descriptions applicable to ﬁnance.
Hawtrey (1919) developed his “inherent instability of credit” around the
idea of balance sheet interactions whereby if I spend more, then somewhere
someone has more income, which is then mechanically available for more
spending, and indirectly prices of the good purchased rise in a price-credit
spiral:
more spending ⇒ more income for others, prices up
⇑ ⇓{
capital gains to inventory holders
creditworthiness improved ⇒ more credit
}
⇐ existing inventories revalued up
In Hawtrey’s view, the job of the CB is to prevent a credit bubble from getting
started, and furthermore such bubbles tend to end at the hands of the CB
as the lender of last resort. Minsky (1977a), in what has become known
as the “Minsky Instability Hypothesis,” renders the feedback more violent
by expanding revaluation not only to inventories but also to collateral and
portfolios:
more capital credit/spending ⇒ more income, more income capitalised
⇑ ⇓{
capital gains to securities holders
creditworthiness up ⇒ more credit
}
⇐ portfolio & collateral values up
Let us add that listing possible destabilising loops such as those above does
not mean that they are necessarily likely to occur or actually operating.
That question remains an empirical and a theoretical exercise. It remains
true, however, that the logical possibilities and scenarios can be helpful in
establishing a systemically safe system.
In a future Systemic Risk Centre Special Paper we shall present a wide variety
of current practical mechanisms that have the potential of creating, in today’s
ﬁnancial system, the sort of systemic risk we deﬁned in this paper, a partial
glimpse of which can be found in Danielsson et al. (2012). Those mechanisms
can be economic, regulatory, legal, technological, political, social or ﬁnancial.
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We shall also attempt to provide tools to limit their ex-ante build-up and
their ferocity, or to cut through the loops once unleashed.
5 Systemic Risk and Social Welfare
5.1 Distortions and Externalities
Not all systemic events are made equal. The size of the ineﬃciencies at-
tached to systemic events depend on the extent to which society depends on
the system under consideration. Also, some events that would be bunched
together under the “systemic event” heading may not be ineﬃcient. For in-
stance, Allen and Gale (1998) construct a theoretical example where bank
runs (when liquidation costs are either inﬁnite or zero) enable the production
of a ﬁrst-best allocation by allowing eﬃcient risk-sharing between early and
late consumers and by allowing the banks to hold eﬃcient portfolios.
Our notion of systemic risk, however, nearly by deﬁnition, hard-wires a wedge
between private and social costs because any one agent contributing to overall
systemic risk does not typically fully bear all the costs imposed upon all
other agents and therefore does not rationally internalise the consequences
of his actions. And symmetrically, if mitigating actions were found, speciﬁc
macroprudential policies would be called due to externalities, because each
individual contributor to systemic risk free-rides on the willingness of others
to pay for ﬁnancial stability and to provide liquidity. It follows that the total
self-declared willingness to pay for ﬁnancial stability and liquidity is less than
the social value of this ﬁnancial stability. Systemic risk policies have a public
good component.
Those actions that contribute to systemic risk can themselves in turn arise
from distortions, such as informational frictions, market power, too-big-to-
fail, abuse or any one of a wide variety of constraints put upon the agent,
including poorly designed rules and regulations. What makes things worse is
that some of these actions that contribute to systemic risk may have exter-
nalities of the “fallacy of composition” sort whereby each agent’s individual
action is well meaning and is perceived to reduce systemic risk, but where
in fact all such actions taken together increase systemic risk. This type of
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externality23 is of special interest because the failure of individual eﬀects to
aggregate at the system level is precisely the reason why a systems analysis
is needed in the ﬁrst place.
Now what can be done about these social costs? In some cases, pinpointed
actions of the authorities can enforce a ﬁrst-best allocation. Examples include
the case of clear-cut externalities such as the single polluter problem where a
market for pollution property rights or a (personalised) tax on pollution can
improve matters by forcing the polluter to internalise the costs by eﬀectively
buying pollution rights at the right price, or the bank-run scenarios in Allen
and Gale (1998) even with costly liquidation where the central bank can
intervene optimally.
In general, however, it would appear that on a systems level the mapping
from the “original polluter” to “pollution” is rarely clear and instead is me-
diated through a web of endogenous and largely unobservable interactions.24
Furthermore, a ﬁnancial system may simply not have an original exogenous
distorting action that can be addressed directly. And even if one could pin-
point to the original sin, it is at this stage not clear yet which instruments are
available legally or acceptable morally that would reduce the cost without
creating unintended consequences whose costs may well outweigh the initial
reduction in social cost. In the spirit of the theory of second best (given
the obvious constraints on policy tools and the multiplicity of distortions),
alleviating one obvious distortion may well lead to an outcome that is Pareto
inferior. What needs to be done is that the problems are studied until they
become much better understood and that suﬃcient data are gathered and
statistical and economic impact analyses performed.
5.2 A Simple Black Box Framework to Illustrate Sys-
temic Externalities
It may be useful in this section to illustrate the ideas developed so far within
a simplistic reduced-form model. Consider an economy consisting of I ﬁ-
nancial institutions (FI). The strictly concave, increasing and diﬀerentiable
objective function ui over consumption xit of institution i is separable in time
23This fallacy is discussed in Samuelson (1947) and goes back to Mill (1850).
24In contrast, standard models in public ﬁnance or in the economics of information
assume that the structure of the economy is common knowledge.
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and states of nature. Assets can be seen as ﬁnancial or as real assets (in
which case they are in positive net supply, like trees), and their exogenous
and constant supply is φ¯. Markets can be complete or incomplete. Assets
pay real dividends at time t + 1 of δt+1 = δ(σt, St+1) units of consumption,
where St+1 is an exogenous shock and σt represents ﬁnancial stability. Assets
can be deﬁned narrowly and made FI-dependent to capture OTC contracts
and direct counterparty risks, as well as too-big-to-fail subsidies and other
preferential treatments.
There is a production function f for the driving state of systemic stability,
σt. Much of the systemic drivers are summarised in the black box function
f . We assume that the process σ is observable to all, although interesting
and realistic extensions would model σ as a latent process subject to ﬁlter-
ing. Individual FIs aﬀect systemic stability, and therefore production δ next
period, through their trading and portfolio choices φi as well as through the
resources zi expended on ﬁnancial stability. The term zit represents the total
current cost of improving risk management systems, risk monitoring, edu-
cation, more careful packaging and describing of structured products, cost
of capital and liquidity buﬀers, extra incentives pay, etc., as well as the op-
portunity costs borne due to lowered risk. We assume that f is concave in
each variable separably, though not necessarily overall concave. To simplify
matters to the extreme, assume that ﬁnancial stability evolves according to
the stochastic diﬀerence equation
σt+1 = σt + f({zit}i∈I), {φit}i∈I ; σt, qt) + St+1 (1)
where S is an exogenous iid shock process.25 This evolution rule is commonly
known by all. Regulations on risk taking are captured through the additional
constraint zit ≥ z(σt). The mapping z(σt) provides regulators with the free-
dom to choose pro– or counter–cyclical policies. One could further imagine
extending the model by allowing z to depend on FI-speciﬁc elements.
FIs aﬀect systemic risk σt+1 via f through their portfolio and risk choices.
The initial portfolio distribution and cross-institution exposures map is given
by {φi0}i∈I . Together with the function f they capture the initial as well as
the evolving network structure of the FIs. For instance, larger positions
of a given asset held by one given FI i may increase global systemic risk
depending on the initial distribution of risk. Similarly, larger investments
25Some interesting non-linearities are ruled out in return for tractability.
40
by one FI i in risk reduction zit may reduce systemic risk. Furthermore, the
dependence of f on σt allows us to capture the fallacy of composition also
whereby the economy can ﬁnd itself in a state σt that leads to a reduction
in ﬁnancial stability when FIs attempt to reduce risk individually, or when
all FIs attempt to reduce risk.26 Together, these actions feed into a new
endogenous distribution of future outputs δ.27
Financial stability is also aﬀected by current asset prices qt, not least due to
pecuniary externalities. Even if FIs would not normally put on a certain ac-
tion, in crises prices sometimes play a dual role, being aﬀected by actions but
also forcing agents to take certain actions. Various value-at-risk constraints
for instance can have such an eﬀect, forcing agents to sell more after a fall of
the price.
For instance, in the paper by Danielsson and Zigrand (2008), a free-riding
externality amongst ﬁnancial institutions creates systemic risk by incentivis-
ing institutions not only to load up on more of the risky securities and skimp
on the liquid securities, but also by increasing the risk that the risky secu-
rities (which represent claims to productive processes) will not be able to
pay oﬀ because of a mis-match in the ownership of the productive securities
and a lack of liquid working capital. Stylistically, the externality amounts
to the choice of a low zi and/or a large holding of some risky assets φi and
consequently a low value of f . The regulator tries to counteract this exter-
nality by imposing a regulatory Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint, represented
stylistically here by zit ≥ z(σt), which has the eﬀect of lowering the ex-ante
probability of this event. It is also shown in that paper that with additional
26As an illustration for I = 2, one can set f(z1, z2;σ) = (α− z2)(z1)2 + (α− z1)(z2)2 +
σ(z1 + z2)2. For large enough σ, f increases in z1, in z2 as well as jointly in (z1, z2). In
other words, in an economy already relatively safe, any increase in expenditures on safety
increase safety further. For low enough σ, however, increased individual safety zi still
increases systemic safety, but if all FIs brusquely try to increase safety (say in a ﬁre sale
when bank capital is already low), then systemic risk increases. If one furthermore pursued
the suggestion by Governor Kohn (p.16 in Kambhu et al. (2007)) that in a market-based
system, sound risk management by all (original emphasis) market participants is essential
to protect against the risk of a low-probability – or “tail” – event causing a ﬁnancial crisis,
then this can for instance be achieved by further multiplying f by an expression such as
min{z1, z2}.
27Since σ enters into production and since the diﬀerence equation exhibits a unit root,
a change in σ can aﬀect the behaviour of the system in a non-negligible way over a very
long horizon, despite the fact that it does not aﬀect the deeper structure of the system,
such as markets, motivations, power and the like.
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noise trading, the imposition of the VaR gives rise to a fallacy of composition
at the outset since the VaR constraint can lead to excessive and coordinated
forced sales of assets in response to the noise trades. Once the economy is
in a crisis (in their paper a low σ represents an inadequate capitalisation
level of banks), the individual safe action of selling risky securities creates
less safety in aggregate as ﬁre sales depreciate capital buﬀers and cause great
uncertainty and risk of meltdown. Alternative justiﬁcations for the impo-
sition of regulatory constraints on risk taking commonly given are moral
hazard considerations or convex compensation arrangements that can lead
agents to engage in overly risky trades. In order to mitigate this, individual
traders within ﬁnancial institutions are commonly subjected to capital and
VaR restrictions, as in Adrian and Shin (2013).
The decentralised price-taking allocation problem is characterised as follows.
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FI i weighs the marginal rate of substitution between today’s consumption
and one additional purchase of assets (the marginal cost qt/1), on the left-
hand side, with the discounted future net marginal beneﬁts of that additional
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unit purchased. The latter is composed of a direct portfolio beneﬁt and of
a systemic risk beneﬁt, β ∂f
∂φit
Git. The marginal portfolio beneﬁt expressed
in current nume´raire is the value to FI i of the additional consumption at
t+1 since the portfolio pays a dividend and can then be sold. The marginal
systemic risk beneﬁts again can be split into two. The ﬁrst term represents
the marginal net beneﬁt expressed in today’s nume´raire (or cost if negative)
of the present value of all future production increments made possible because
of the eﬀect of the current choice of portfolio holdings on systemic stability
(including the future losses due to excessively risky portfolios). The second
term is the present value of the gains arising from future reductions in the
tightness of the regulatory constraint due to a more prudent (or less prudent
if negative) choice of investments today.











This amounts to setting the marginal rate of transformation between current
consumption to FI i and ﬁnancial stability, on the left-hand side, equal to the
relevant sum across future periods of marginal rates of substitution between
consumption to FI i today and ﬁnancial stability, on the right hand side.




















Given the number of externalities present in this problem, not least through
its network eﬀects and its public good nature, the private benevolent contri-
butions to the provision of ﬁnancial stability are too low and socially sub-
optimal because FI i in its private cost-beneﬁt analysis, when deciding upon
how much to invest in zit and in φ
i
t, ignores the spillover beneﬁts or costs of
stability arising from his own actions for all other FIs. Or in other words,
when engaging in systemically unsafe behaviour, the FI ignores the welfare
losses imposed on society in general. To see this concretely, we can derive the
Bowen-Lindhal-Samuelson conditions from the social problem (with welfare




























The FOC can again be combined into (5).
In contrast to the decentralised outcome (2, 4), the social problem (while still
assuming decentralised market clearing and price-taking behaviour) balances
the MRT (and this term is independent of i) with the sum of all MRS of all
FIs. The planner compares the welfare-weighted marginal cost to FI i of
investing one more unit into stability with the marginal beneﬁt accruing to
all FIs, not just to the FI i that does the investing. Alternatively the planner
balances the marginal beneﬁt to FI i from engaging in a slightly more risky
endeavour with the total societal marginal cost, including the MRT and all
the deleterious eﬀects on other agents’ utilities. For instance, assume that




t are larger than the private gains
Git, the right-hand side in (7) is smaller in the case of free-riding than in the
case where FIs are compelled to internalise the eﬀects on systemic risk, and
hence ∂f
∂zit
is larger. In light of the assumed concavity of f , and assuming
the normal situation where f is (locally) increasing in zit, investments z
i
t in
ﬁnancial stability on behalf of FI i are lower than socially optimal. Systemic
risk is suboptimally large.
One recovers the well-known frictionless Euler equations by one of three
means. The ﬁrst instance occurs if there is no external eﬀect of individual
portfolio choices on systemic stability, ∂f
∂φit
= 0. The second case obtains if
the systemic risk monitoring technology is inﬁnitely eﬀective, ∂f
∂zit
→ ∞. The
ﬁnal case calls for a (possibly personalised and contingent) regulatory policy




if regulators had full information on FIs and the means of micro-regulating
them ﬁnely, and if FIs accepted, without gaming, the policy zi(σt; s¯
i
t) as a








t) considered exogenous, then
the regulatory policy that implements a frictionless constrained optimum
(equalising the payoﬀ-relevant intertemporal marginal rates of substitution
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This policy sets all {Git} to zero and conﬁrms λit = ∂u
i
∂xit
for all times and
states. We do not believe that large FIs would consider such a regulatory
policy to be exogenous, but rather that self-selection constraints would need
to be imposed.
This leads on to the next question, namely the optimal regulatory rules given
the informational restrictions under which regulators operate where decisions
need to be based on a few observable statistics β in lieu of the full observation
π, including situations where this informational discrepancy is strategic due
to private information issues such as moral hazard and adverse selection?
How can the mappings (f, δ) serve to deﬁne what a systemically important
ﬁnancial institution is, both at the margin and overall? This assessment for
FI i depends on the interactions with all other FIs through (f, δ). In real life,
information extracted from (f, δ) can act as a variable entering into macro-
prudential rules such as countercyclical capital buﬀers, leverage constraints
or direct bank levies, all subsumed under z in this black-box representation.
The regulator also needs to keep in mind that depending on σ, the decen-
tralised provision of ﬁnancial stability can either be under– or overprovided
for. To what extent do the empirical systemic risk measures currently pro-
posed or in use, as summarised for instance by Bisias et al. (2012), capture
these systemic externalities as laid out in the previous equations? These
questions indicate the direction into which future research needs to move to.
Making the endogenous risk mechanisms that are hidden in the black box
above visible is one of the top priorities in academic research on systemic
risk.
5.3 Should all Systemic Events be Prevented?
If one could, should crises always be prevented? In this regard it is diﬃcult to
improve upon the passage by Pareto (1897, p.297) that might have inspired
Schumpeter’s own concept of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1943):
If it was possible to completely avoid all crises, would it be useful
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to do so? One may be tempted to respond in the aﬃrmative,
but a slightly deeper analysis of this question would lead to new
doubts creeping in. It is not at all certain that the rhythmi-
cal movement is not one of the conditions of economic progress.
(. . . ) Of course, one needs to prevent making crises sharper still
through imprudent measures taken, and one needs to attempt
to reduce its ill-eﬀects. (. . . ) Completely suppressing a certain
movement, or attempting to reduce its violence in exceptional
cases, are two essentially diﬀerent things.
Similarly, Friedman (1959) writes
After all, uncertainty and instability are unavoidable concomi-
tants of progress and change. They are one face of a coin of
which the other is freedom.
Other than for the fact that one could not prevent all systemic events in
ﬁnance, short of shutting the entire ﬁnancial system down, a cost-beneﬁt
analysis needs to be undertaken both in terms of ex-ante measures aimed at
reducing build-ups of systemic risk and in terms of ex-post measures aimed
at ironing out the painful consequences of a systemic event, or at least aimed
at not making things even worse (as some pro-cyclical policies do).
Within the black-box framework presented in Section 5.2, stricter rules aimed
at eliminating systemic events can be seen to have the following eﬀects. First,
there is a marginal cost today of imposing stricter rules in terms of marginal
utility of foregone current consumption. Second, the level of z needs to
recognise the eﬃciency of the production function of systemic stability f . Not
only can the production function have low productivity, but short of raising
z to exorbitant levels one runs the risk that stricter regulations may run
into a negative marginal productivity region, as happens during an episode
of the fallacy of composition. Second, the eﬀect of stricter rules on the
public good σ further leads to a change in the investment opportunity set
through δ(σt, St+1). This can capture for instance the eﬀect that a more
regulated environment can stiﬂe innovation and reduce the outliers in the
future, perhaps reducing some very bad ones but also preventing some very
favourable ones. In a dynamic economy with production, innovation and
human capital, such a straight jacket on risky but innovative investments
today can potentially lead to a reduction in longer-term growth rates, as well
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as to a genuinely changed system. This is the essence of the ideas exposited
above that link interrelationships to nonlinearities which lead to progress and
cycles, including the crises and recessions embedded in cycles.
In a nutshell, a balance needs to be found between those interventions that
can at low cost reduce externalities that would have otherwise led to easily
avoidable losses (for example the provision of liquidity in a liquidity panic,
or the nudging to eﬃciency in a prisoner’s dilemma situation) and those
interventions that are excessively costly in terms of direct costs or indirect
costs (such as stiﬂed innovation or poor incentives).
5.4 Policy Interventions
It is our hope that by studying systemic risk further, some clarity can be
gained that would allow policy makers to ﬁnd the right policies that point in
a social-welfare-improving direction, at least when viewed through the lens
β rather than π. This direction need not point to the immediate intended
outcome. In other words, since policy makers are unlikely ever to be able to
know and keep track of all the characteristics and all the actions of all ﬁnan-
cial players, policy makers’ objective functions are in practice directly over
some macro characteristics of β. For instance, central bankers may follow
a Taylor rule,28 ﬁscal policy makers look at metrics of income distribution
and ﬁscal deﬁcits, and ﬁnancial policy makers may look at overall market
quality metrics such as overall eﬀective spreads or market resilience, metrics
capturing the extent to which gains from trade can be reaped in ﬁnancial
markets, or in fact metrics capturing the build-up of certain fragilities that
can lead to a systemic event.
In addition to these more ex-ante policies trying to control the distortions
that can create systemic risk, a diﬃcult undertaking given the lack of in-
formation and data on individual actors, we believe that following Pareto’s
quote there is a lot of value in mitigating the negative ex-post eﬀects of an
event once the seed has been sown. This is because contrary to the huge
variety of initial situations and shocks that can create the ﬁrst losses, the
accelerating mechanisms that aggravate the initial shocks and that are re-
sponsible for much of the social welfare losses are often the same. It is now
28One can interpret the Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993) as counteracting the Wicksellian
cumulative process loop by raising real rates when inﬂation picks up.
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well understood that some rules and regulations can in such ex-post circum-
stances become aggravators in lieu of dampers. For instance, in Danielsson
and Zigrand (2008) a free-riding externality amongst ﬁnancial institutions
creates systemic risk, and a regulatory VaR constraint has the eﬀect of low-
ering the ex-ante probability of this event. However, once the systemic event
has obtained anyway, the crisis is much deepened by the pro-cyclical regula-
tory VaR constraints.
One avenue suggested by Morris and Shin (2008) and by Keating and Mar-
shall (2010) is to view the f mapping as representing liquidity and to move
from a risk-based regulation more towards a liquidity-based macroprudential
regulation. As with stability, liquidity has a public good aspect and is there-
fore inadequately provided for in a laissez-faire setting. The central bank at
the core of the monetary system plays the role of liquidity provider through
its repo and haircut policies. Together with the regulator (say, through lever-
age constraints and the like that act as a tax), the central bank can therefore
nudge the size and the composition of the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institu-
tions towards an internalisation of these externalities.
In that sense, what is needed are two sorts of measures, measures that prevent
build-up of systemic fragility (including the feedback loops involved in the
build-up), and measures that cut through the propagating feedback loops
once the systemic event has realised. Amongst the former one can count
leverage constraints, the removal of various rules that encourage pro-cyclical
behaviour, or the various sources of moral hazard emphasised by Dow (2000).
Well-known examples of the latter are lender of last resort and market-maker
of last resort interventions, living wills, rules facilitating the quick unwinding
of positions, smart circuit breakers on markets limit-order books, the tem-
porary suspension of rules that would otherwise reinforce downturns, and so
on.
This leads to the currently open issue of not only the composition but also
the number of policy tools. As pointed out by Tinbergen (1952), in order
to achieve optimality the number of instruments in general needs to match
the number of objectives. In cybernetic systems more generally, the Law
of Requisite Variety says that the variety in the outcomes, if minimal, can
be decreased further only by a corresponding increase in that of the actions
available. Only variety in actions can force down the variety in outcomes:
“variety can destroy variety” (Ashby, 1956, p.207). Macroprudential author-
ities have currently at their disposal a very limited number of rather blunt
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tools. More tools will need to be devised in order to achieve a preferrable
outcome.
6 On the relationship between Systemic Risk
and related concepts
Given the proposed deﬁnitions of systemic risk and complexity (namely, that
a system is complex if its emergent properties are novel and suﬃciently strong
and that systemic risk is the risk of unbalanced and powerfully destructive
positive feedback loops generated within the system that alter and damage,
at least temporarily, the structure of the system), systemic risk can only
occur in complex systems.
Like systematic risk, systemic risk as deﬁned herein cannot be diversiﬁed
either. However, the nonlinearities involved in the feedback loops suggest
clearly that systemic risk is separate from what is usually called systematic
risk, or non-diversiﬁable risk, in the ﬁnance literature, that represents the risk
of an aggregate event (not purely a redistributive event). Typical examples of
systematic risk would be aggregate technology shocks, aggregate endowment,
output, preference or monetary shocks etc. These systematic events may
correspond to very large shocks, such as for instance the power-law shocks
in Gabaix (2009) and Barro and Ursu´a (2012), but the system is expected to
continue functioning normally and properly. This distinction has also been
emphasised by Hansen (2012).
Formally, a simple multi-factor aﬃne dynamic general equilibrium model that
is hit by an extreme shock drawn from a fat-tailed distribution exhibits large
losses and a jump in the state variables to new levels, but the equations that
govern the evolutions are unaﬀected by the shock. The economy locally works
as before, only from lower levels of wealth, etc. This we call an aggregate
shock. A systemic shock implies (i) either that the structure of the economy
changes (say, with some of the institutions vanishing) and therefore that the
system of equations that governs the evolution itself has radically changed,
or (ii) that the institutions and the equations governing their behaviour are
still present, but that these equations are suﬃciently non-linear or reﬂect
suﬃcient hysteresis and path-dependencies that the local characteristics of
the economy exhibit quite distinct properties. In both cases, the equations
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reﬂect an ex-post more dysfunctional system.
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A Appendix: System
This appendix has been inspired by Mandy (1988) and borrows freely from
many authors and philosophers.
A.1 Everyday Use of the Term “System”
We said that the casual speaker would perhaps mention three characteristics
of what constitutes a system, as opposed to being merely a collection (for
a collection of quotes and illustrations, http://www.muellerscience.com/
spezialitaeten /System/System Definitionen.htm and http://en.wiki
quote.org/wiki/System):
1. these expressions make reference to something;
2. their elements imply relationships;
3. and many systems change and evolve over time but keep their identity.
A.1.1 Reference
Even in cases where the reference is not explicitly spelled out, it would be
hard to deny its existence. Each one of the expressions refers to
• a centre that is easily identiﬁable (sun, central nervous system (e.g.
brain), federal state, central bank, etc.); or
• a fundamental idea or value, irrespective of the discipline studying it
(e.g. “liberty” in the liberal system analysed by diﬀerent disciplines);
or
• alternatively to a unique “base” or “standard” of measure (e.g. the
metric system, the standard of value of a price system); or
• a law or fundamental rule the elements of the system depend on (e.g.
family links in a kinship system, resolution of equations in an equation
system, data analysis in an information system).
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Each system thereby implies reference to a principle recognised as the pri-
mary or original cause or fundamental rule or method all the elements in
the system depend on, or as Kant said in 1786: “ein nach Prinzipien geord-
netes Ganzes der Erkenntnis.” This commonality serves as the centre and
the common reference, and creates the unity that sets a system apart from an
aggregate. The concepts of “system” and “reference” are tightly linked, and
some thinkers choose the concept of a “reference system” as the fundamental
concept of their theoretical approach to systems (e.g. Duquesne de la Vinelle,
1969).
It is evident that such a reference is totally absent when talking of a bunch
of stars,29 a pile of sand, lines of code (as opposed to an operating system) or
miscellaneous facts; the casual speaker would not qualify them as “system.”
In the human and social sciences, this unity of a man-made system creates
an aim or common interest for the system, “By Systems I understand any
numbers of men joined in one Interest, or one Businesse” (Hobbes, 1651).
In that sense social systems have been argued to be of a higher order of
complexity than physical or biological systems. From a physics point of
view, a plane advances from origin to destination due to the propulsive forces
generated by the engines and the plane body and wings – a mechanical
explanation. From an economics point of view, the plane ﬂies to destination
due to the mutually beneﬁcial terms found by the airline as provider of the
service and its customers as to the desirability and proﬁtability of servicing
this route – a ﬁnalist explanation.30
While smaller social subsystems are created expressly with an aim in mind,
the overall market system can have an aim also even though no one agent (and
no social planner) has created it that way. As argued by Hayek (1989), the
reason that the market system acquired the aim of implementing economicity
29The Swiss mathematician J.H. Lambert wrote (Lambert, 1761): “We have only to
attend to the solar system, and we shall perceive the utility of a central body on which the
whole depends. In virtue of this body, it rarely happens that the planets and comets dis-
turb each other, and these extraordinary instances form but triﬂing exceptions. But were
we to retrench the central body, the general law would be destroyed, and the exceptions
alone would remain.”
30To quote Halliday (2005): “A physical system is just that: a physical system. What
is systematized is matter itself, and the processes in which the system is realized are also
material. But a biological system is more complex: it is both biological and physical – it
is matter with the added component of life; and a social system is more complex still: it
is physical, and biological, with the added component of social order, or value.
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lies in the fact that the market system has itself emerged as a result of
evolutionary forces operating via natural selection not only on individuals’
behaviour but also on rules and social structure, the θ in our deﬁnition of a
system S := (θ,M).
Let us consider some examples from ﬁnance and economics.
Banking System. A set of deposit-taking banks becomes a banking system
in the modern era only if the banks have a fundamental reference to
a central bank. For one, banks rely on the central bank for liquidity.
Since banks are required to convert deposits and credits into central
bank money at the simple request of depositors or creditors, there is
a permanent reference to central bank money and therefore the the
central bank (CB). Banks also rely on a central payment and clearing
system.
Price System. That the expression price system is commonly used in ev-
eryday speech stems from the fact that the exchange value of all com-
modities is expressed with reference to a basis or common denominator
that then becomes the yardstick of value, the nume´raire. It is this ref-
erence to a unit – often central bank currency – that allows all prices
to enter into a system, also called the “numeration system.” It is thus
possible to express the value of any commodity by one number, as op-
posed to specifying the full set of combinations of the quantities of the
other commodities that the given commodity can be exchanged for,
which is Ricardo’s deﬁnition of value (Ricardo, 1817).
A.1.2 Interrelationships
All due respect, you got no f*****g idea what it’s like to be Num-
ber One. Every decision you make aﬀects every other f*****g
thing. It’s too much to deal with almost.
Source: Tony Soprano
“The coelacanth? The prehistoric ﬁsh? But how could one pos-
sibly aﬀect the other?”
53
“Ah. Now there you’re asking. The complexities of cause and
eﬀect defy analysis. Not only is the continuum like a human
body, it is also very like a piece of badly put up wallpaper. Push
down a bubble somewhere, another one pops up somewhere else.”
Source: Professor Urban “Reg” Chronotis in Douglas Adam’s
Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective Agency
A second characteristic of a system are the relations that link the elements
of a system to each other, forming a network of interrelations.
In a pile or cluster of unstructured individuals, elements are only juxtaposed,
without any links between them. This is not the case in a system, where
independence and dependence are replaced by mutual interdependence. It is
this interdependence that can give rise to complex outcomes (see e.g. May,
1973).
Let us consider some examples from ﬁnance and economics.
Banking System. Banks in a deposit taking-banking system exhibit a highly
dense network of links. A web of mutual exposures and credits is cre-
ated across banks. The daily settlement process across banks settles
these obligations each day by transferring corresponding settlement as-
sets. Systemically important clearing and settlement systems have the
CB as a settlement agent for systemic stability reasons (as the govern-
ment supports the CB), so the settlement asset is CB money, i.e. the
balances held in accounts at the CB. In the UK, this role is played by
the Bank of England’s Real-Time Gross Settlement infrastructure.31
Price System. A price system relates the value of each commodity to a
common yardstick, a common unit of account, and relative values can
then be deduced between any two commodities with a non-zero price.
Relative prices express interrelations between any set of commodities,
allowing a direct comparison.
As an example of an economy that does not form a system, assume two sep-
arate islands with no links of any sort. There will be two price vectors, a
31For details, refer to Dent and Dison (2012), and for a description of the systemic
importance of intraday liquidity provision (intraday needs arising due to the timing mis-
matches between incoming and outgoing payments) and the central bank provision of
intraday liquidity, see Ball et al. (2011).
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dichotomy. While each island has a price system, the overall pricing mecha-
nism is not a price system.
As we shall see below, once the economy is formed of an array of interre-
lationships, its aggregate outcome may become hard to predict (so-called
irreducibility), as Tony Soprano, the head of a New Jersey mobster family in
the HBO TV series “The Sopranos”, has realised early on.
A.1.3 Continuity of identity
A system contains within itself the seeds of some more complete
evolution, but it does not admit of arbitrary alterations.
Elias Magnus Fries (1825)
Not all systems are dynamic. But most real life systems evolve and are
adaptable to – as well as shape – their environments. In such a case, the
system must not be an ephemeral accident at some time period.
Or in the words of Klir (1991), to qualify for the name “system,” continuity
of identity needs to be present. This is true whether the system is atem-
poral and ﬁxed or dynamic and changing. Something that is not able to
preserve its structure amid change –if there is change– is never recognised as
a system. As argued for instance by Allais (1967), Williamson32 and Hayek
(1989), dynamic, adaptive and evolutionary forces over time can select θ in
a way to ensure the system tends to continue to function properly. This ten-
dency to try to improve the usefulness of the economic system is exactly the
deﬁnition of a self-organising system given by Ashby (1947). Modelling this
phenomenon is diﬃcult, so much so that some economists (e.g. Lucas, 1988a)
go so far as to state that what matters to economists is the steady state of
this adaptive process: “technically, I think of economics as studying decision
rules that are steady states of some adaptive process, decision rules that are
found to work over a range of situations and hence are no longer revised
32E.g. refer to Williamson (1977): “A strategy which I ﬁnd attractive is to adopt the
viewpoint that economic systems knowingly or demonstrably sacriﬁce eﬃciency only with
reluctance, whence a showing that a rule is to reduce eﬃciency will predictably give rise
to adaptive [original emphasis] eﬀorts to mitigate these losses.”
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appreciably as more experience accumulates.” Similarly, it appears that the
recent literature on complexity theory and on complex evolving systems has
perhaps excessively abstracted away from goal directedness. In order to rein-
troduce it, we believe that the disciplines of law and political science would
be brought fruitfully into economic and ﬁnancial research precisely so as to
model the dynamic evolution of the ﬁnancial system more accurately and
more purposefully.
Among ﬁnancial examples we can pick:
Banking System. The banking system has evolved greatly over the last 100
years, to and from universal banking, oscillating back and forth between
investment banks and ﬁnancial holding companies. The system adapts
to the realities of the world, in particular the regulatory cycles.
Price System. The price system evolves both in terms of absolute prices,
i.e. inﬂation, and in terms of relative prices, say the relative prices of en-
ergy, fossil fuels or food stuﬀs. The location dimension has also changed
dramatically, many world markets have become more integrated, while
others (e.g. ﬁnancial exchanges and other trading venues) have become
more fragmented as monopolies have been broken. Still, the forces that
underpin them remain the same because the functions remain the same.
For instance, high frequency algorithms now arbitrage across trading
venues, pocketing pennies and weaving liquidity pools together.
In other words, this property of a system is simply the fact that as a system
evolves and changes, it remains recognisable as such: “A system is recognized
as such by remaining recognizable as ‘itself’ in spite of changes in its detailed
appearance” (Rapoport, 1986).
A.2 Scientiﬁc use of the term “system”
La science est un syste`me de relations.
Henri Poincare´ (1927)
We now try to describe the major elements of what constitutes a system in
scientiﬁc terms. The main ideas had started to crystallise in Kant (1781),
and it is worth quoting him more fully:
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By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system.
Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science;
it will be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is
the doctrine of the scientiﬁc in cognition, and therefore necessar-
ily forms part of our methodology. Reason cannot permit our
knowledge to remain in an unconnected and rhapsodistic state,
but requires that the sum of our cognitions should constitute a
system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends of rea-
son. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under
one idea. (. . . ) This idea is the conception–given by reason–of the
form of a whole, in so far as the conception determines a-priori
not only the limits of its content, but the place which each of
its parts is to occupy. The scientiﬁc idea contains, therefore, the
end and the form of the whole which is in accordance with that
end. The unity of the end, to which all the parts of the system
relate, and through which all have a relation to each other, com-
municates unity to the whole system, so that the absence of any
part can be immediately detected from our knowledge of the rest;
and it determines a-priori the limits of the system, thus exclud-
ing all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole is thus an
organism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio); it may
grow from within (per intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase
by external additions (per appositionem). (. . . ) We require, for
the execution of the idea of a system, a schema, that is, a content
and an arrangement of parts determined a-priori by the principle
which the aim of the system prescribes.
A.2.1 Deductibility
A system is a multitude of phenomena which, being related to
one another as cause and eﬀects, all spring from a ﬁrst law.
Abbe´ Etienne Bonnot de Condillac
A scientiﬁc endeavour strives for logical consistency, trying to prevent con-
tradictions and dichotomies. This is the aim of an axiomatic formalisation.
The consistency and validity achieved through deductibility from ﬁrst prin-
ciples can be viewed as the scientiﬁc expression of the reference attribute of
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a system to a principle or a centre.33
A scientiﬁc theory in economics is grounded on the axiomatic principle of
economics, let us call this the axiom of economicity or the economising prin-
ciple. For Menger (1871), economising is the principle, the “aim” in Kant’s
words, at the core of the theory of value because economising allows the sat-
isfaction of many needs by scarce resources. Since the epistemological work
of Robbins (1932), it has become generally accepted that the axiom of eco-
nomicity is nothing but the economising and non-wastage of rare resources
with multiple ends. This sets economics apart form other disciplines study-
ing the same topic but from a diﬀerent disciplinary angle due to the diﬀerent
starting principle that reﬂects the approach taken by various disciplines. The
endogenous elements of a system follow from the logical organisation deduced
from this principle of economising.
The exact form of the expressions of the axiom of economicity can be man-
ifold, depending on the question at hand, be they the optimal allocation
of scarce resources, or social welfare, or the full employment of factors of
production, social choice or optimal taxation, etc.
Since formal elements (such as marginal utility and marginal productivity
functions, demand and supply functions, production functions, monetary
functions etc.) are deducted on the basis of a common desire to economise,
these elements are coherent and serve a purpose, they become functions in
an application of the calculus of economics. This coherence is reﬂected in
a logical structure common to many economics problems, as pointed out by
Koopmans (1957), due to the idea of maximisation subject to various sets of
constraints.
This functional role of economic variables reveals their typically economic
role without which they could not fulﬁl their economic function within the
economic system, which in turn would mean that the system itself could not
function eﬃciently, could not have hope that its aim is being fulﬁlled. This
goal directness in economic and social systems may not be present in physical
systems, though some have argued it is present in biological systems in light
of the ﬁnality and functionality of certain organic characteristics through the
33We follow general usage (and Kant) and require deﬁnitially a “system” to be coherent,
though some authors use the term slightly more generally, e.g. Stebbing (1930, p.198):
“A system is said to be coherent if every fact in the system is related to every other fact
in the system by relations that are not merely conjunctive. A deductive system aﬀords a
good example of a coherent system.”
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action of natural selection. Goal directedness (Allais, 1981; Hayek, 1989;
Klir, 1991) is simply the existence of an aim and a function. In turn, goal
directedness itself is a reﬂection of the desire to organise in an eﬃcient way
to abide by the axiom of economicity, to economise. This desire may in turn
be the result of a process of selection.34
Price System. Money fulﬁls a variety of monetary functions, including the
numeration function, acting as the reference term of a price function.
This function of the monetary price system follows from the necessity
to compare the values of multiple commodities, requiring a common
denominator, a common reference base for the economic actors. Its
role is truly to allow the real world economy to function in a way that
an economy based on pure barter could not. This function allows a set
of values to become a system of prices.
At the same time, prices are determined by a pricing function reﬂect-
ing the marginal valuations of the many actors in the economy. At
equilibrium, subject to the various frictions of the economy, resources
are allocated according to a common driver that attempts to equalise
the MRS and MRT across the system, the invisible hand of the central
auctioneer guided by competitive economising forces.
Banking System. Underlying the banking sector is the function of mone-
tary liquidity. This function must be assumed in a modern ﬁnancial
system deriving from the Banking Principle by the existence of a lender
of last resort, a function fulﬁlled by the central banks.
34The coherence and well functioning of social systems allows them be analysed further
in terms of the internal order they possess. Order is deﬁned (Stebbing, 1930) as a “state
of aﬀairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other
that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole
to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a
good chance of proving correct.” Hayek (1989) distinguishes between two sources of order,
grown, or spontaneous, order on one hand and made, or deliberate, order on the other
hand. These two orders distinguish themselves in terms of the distinct complexities they
may achieve. Hayek argues that while both serve functions, made systems have more of a
deliberate purpose compared to grown systems that are better called purposive.
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A.2.2 Irreducibility
As mentioned before, a system is characterised by the interrelationships be-
tween the various components. The main idea is that a system possesses
a degree of complexity that is larger than the one of its components, or in
other words, that the system possesses properties that cannot be reduced
to those of its components, the emergence basis. This irreducibility must be
attributed to the presence of relations that unite the components.
A property possessed by the system but not by its constituent elements, and
which cannot obviously be deduced from the properties of its constituent ele-
ments, is often called an emergent property. Emergence has the dictum that
the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Classically this concept is at-
tributed to the British thinkers on emergence, the so-called British Emergen-
tists, John Stuart Mill35 and George Henry Lewes, although certain sources
trace its origins back to the Greek antique medical doctor Galien as well as
to Aristotle36 (Sartenaer (2013) provides a useful historical and philosophi-
cal background). Another term for “irreducibility” has been coined by Fuller
(1963):“Synergy is the only word in our language that means behavior of
whole systems unpredicted by the separately observed behaviors of any of
the system’s separate parts or any subassembly of the system’s parts. There
is nothing in the chemistry of a toenail that predicts the existence of a human
being.” In a literal sense, the injection of medicines is an instance of emer-
gence in the sense of the total being more than the sums since oftentimes
the injection of a double dose has more than double the eﬀect of two isolated
doses. Or to give an economics example, the merger of two companies may
lead, for any given level of inputs, to an output larger than the sum of the
35Mill (John Stuart Mill outlined his version of emergentism in System of Logic (1843))
called heteropathic and Lewes (1875) called emergent the case where the eﬀect of the com-
plex cause is not equivalent to the mathematical sum of the eﬀects provoked by the isolated
partial causes. Broad (1925) moves away from the narrow summation straightjacket and
proposes a third interpretation of the classical maxim of emergence around the concept
of non-deductibility, meaning the properties of the whole cannot be deduced solely by the
properties of the elements. The contemporaneous version thereof is irreducibility. This is
an active research topic in modern philosophy and researchers are proposing a variety of
extensions to irreducibility that shall not concern us here. Please see Sartenaer (2010) for
a useful background discussion and further details.
36Aristotle writes in book 8 on Metaphysics, Section 1045a, that “In all things which
have a plurality of parts, and which are not a total aggregate but a whole of some sort
distinct from the parts, there is some cause of unity [. . . ].”
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two isolated outputs through the operation of economies of scale and scope.
This illustrates one of the relationships of emergence to nonlinearities.
Systems that possess strong or novel emergent properties are often called
complex systems. Not every system with emergent properties is necessarily
complex.37 As Simon (1996) says on p. 184,
. . . in such systems [complex systems] the whole is more than the
sum of the parts in the weak but important pragmatic sense that,
given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction,
it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole.
As examples, a living cell is more than the sum of inert molecules that it is
composed of since it can reproduce by mitosis while the inert molecules it
is composed of cannot. Human conscience is more than a sum of neurons.
In the main text, we have seen the example of a price system in greater
detail, but in a nutshell, the equilibrium pricing function that sets the ex-
cess demand vectors to zero possesses properties that cannot be found in the
behaviour of prices if one considers the excess demand schedules for each
commodity or for each agent separately, as in partial equilibrium analysis.
For instance, aggregate rationality can be seen as an emergent property in
household choice. Becker (1962) has shown that even irrational and impulsive
agents tend to have demand functions that are downward-sloping due to the
power of the budget constraint. Even though there will be many exceptions
on individual demands, “the market demand curve in markets with many
irrational households would, however, be negatively inclined, and the mar-
ket’s revealed preferences system could be said to be rational (consistent and
transitive) . . . Hence the market would act as if “it” were rational not only
when households were rational, but also when they were inert, impulsive, or
otherwise irrational.”
A diﬀerent approach to the emergence of aggregate rationality exploits natu-
ral selection. As we are reminded by Kirman (2006), Johnson (1968) argued
that the system can have properties that are not dependent on the speciﬁc
behaviour of individuals, and in particular that the aggregate structure may
37For instance, merging two simple production functions f1(x1), f2(x2) that exhibit ﬁrst
increasing and then decreasing returns to scale leads to an output larger than the previous
sum of outputs (over a range of inputs), but this emergent property is trivial to compute.
On the other hand, merging two mega banks may well lead to outcomes that are hard to
anticipate, not least because links are broken and new connections made.
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result from natural selection and therefore exhibits as a whole a certain ra-
tionality even if the individuals that make up the system do not. Under
some circumstances, rationality emerges by natural selection. As a result the
system as a whole behaves like a large optimising individual.38
38To quote Johnson, “it has been shown. . . that whether ﬁrms consciously seek to maxi-
mize proﬁts and minimize costs or not, competition will eliminate the ineﬃcient ﬁrms; and
that whether consumer behaviour is rational or purely random, the demand curves for a
product will tend to slope downwards as in the Marshallian analysis. In consequence, it is
possible for economists to treat the economy as an interdependent system responding to
change according to certain general principles of a rational kind, with considerably more
conﬁdence than appeared justiﬁable thirty years ago.”
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